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Transformations in Health Policy: An Analysis of Alzheimer’s Disease Testing, Medicaid 
Enrollment, and Insurance Market Concentration 
 
Abstract 
 
 This dissertation consists of three quantitative papers addressing contemporary issues in 
health policy. The first paper draws on a survey of 2,678 adults from the United States and four 
European countries to assess demand for a hypothetical early medical test for Alzheimer’s disease 
(AD). Overall, 67% of respondents reported that they would be “very” or “somewhat” likely to get 
the test if it were available. Through logistic regression analysis, we find that interest was higher 
among those worried about developing AD, with an immediate blood relative with AD, and who 
have provided care for AD patients. Knowing that AD is fatal did not influence demand, except 
among those with an affected blood relative. We expect that a test becoming available could 
precipitate the creation of a large constituency of asymptomatic, diagnosed adults, affecting a range 
of health policy decisions. 
The second paper utilizes Current Population Survey data to explore state-level Medicaid 
enrollment rates among eligible parents between 2003 and 2010, focusing on the interaction of race 
and ethnicity and political ideology. Using logistic regression analysis, we find that average take-up 
for Hispanics in conservative states was 23%, whereas take-up was 38% for both whites and blacks 
in those states, adjusting for state and individual demographics. These differences abated in liberal 
and moderate states. Among eligible Hispanics, enrollment rates were less than half as high in 
conservative states than in liberal states (23% versus 61%). Adjusting for differences in state 
Medicaid policies narrowed these disparities significantly, highlighting the importance of new 
provisions aimed at streamlining enrollment procedures across all states. 
 iv!
 The last paper draws on public and private data from 2007 to 2010 to analyze how 
administrative spending by health insurers and providers varied across states with different levels of 
insurance and hospital market concentration. Using regression analysis, we find that in provider 
offices, high levels of insurance concentration were associated with lower administrative costs. If all 
states were as concentrated as the most concentrated state in our sample, we would expect 
nationwide savings of $3.6 billion in administrative expenses. However, market concentration did 
not reduce administrative spending by insurers or hospitals. 
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Paper I: “Would You Want to Know?” An Analysis of International Public Opinion on 
Demand for Early Medical Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease 
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Introduction 
 
In 2011, international experts revised the diagnostic criteria and guidelines used to identify 
Alzheimer’s disease.1–4 As part of this revision, the group proposed a research agenda focused on 
early detection of Alzheimer’s disease (AD), particularly when the disease is in a preclinical stage: 
after key biological changes have started to occur, but before the onset of noticeable symptoms. 
Their hope was that identifying the disease in this preclinical state would facilitate the development 
of new treatments to slow or halt the progression of the disease.5 Across the globe, early diagnostic 
and predictive tests using Alzheimer’s disease biomarkers—early biological signals indicating the 
presence or absence of AD—are underway, and showing promising results. Although nascent, 
efforts to create an early medical test for Alzheimer’s disease are gaining traction and may soon be 
available for broad populations of asymptomatic patients. While this may result in tremendous 
breakthroughs regarding treatment, it raises practical, ethical, and financial questions for individuals 
and communities across the globe. Most of all, people all over the world will face a decision: should 
they get tested? Would they want to know whether they will get this fatal, untreatable disease? 
This paper draws on public opinion data from four Western European countries and the 
United States to assess potential demand for early diagnostic testing for Alzheimer’s disease. While 
other public opinion surveys on Alzheimer’s disease have focused on results from just one country, 
this survey offers a unique opportunity to examine beliefs across five countries to better assess how 
attitudes and beliefs vary across countries with different health systems, cultures, and experiences 
with Alzheimer’s disease.6 In an effort to delve further into some of challenges ahead, we explore 
some of the factors associated with high and low levels of interest in early medical testing for AD, 
employing constructs from the Health Belief Model, a commonly used theoretical model that 
predicts utilization of health services.7 Our results suggest that demand for Alzheimer’s testing 
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among asymptomatic patients could be high across all five countries, particularly among those who 
perceive themselves to be at high risk for the disease.  
Literature Review 
Background on Alzheimer’s disease  
Alzheimer’s disease is a terminal illness that slowly destroys brain cells, impairing a person’s 
memory and ability to carry out activities of daily living. 8,9 Evidence suggests that a build-up of beta-
amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles precipitate the brain degeneration and memory loss 
associated with Alzheimer’s disease.10 This build-up can begin 20 to 30 years before the clinical onset 
of the disease, but historically, this change has been hard to detect using commonplace diagnostic 
protocols, which rely substantially on clinical observation of symptoms.11,12 
 There are two types of Alzheimer’s disease: early-onset and late-onset. Early-onset 
Alzheimer’s, which accounts for a small fraction of all Alzheimer’s disease cases (about 5%), affects 
populations below the age of 65—typically individuals in their 30s, 40s, and 50s. Most of these cases 
are inherited—a form described as familial Alzheimer’s disease—and linked to mutations in three 
genes: APP, PSEN 1, or PSEN 2. If a person has one of these mutations, she will definitely develop 
familial Alzheimer’s disease, which has a more rapid clinical progression than late-onset AD. Late-
onset Alzheimer’s disease, which is more common in populations over age 65, accounts for about 95 
percent of cases. The genetic risk profile for this form of the disease is less clear, leading experts to 
conclude that it is caused by a combination of genetic, environmental, and lifestyle factors.13,14 Given 
its dominance, late-onset Alzheimer’s disease is the focus of the remainder of this paper. 
Medicine offers few tools to address Alzheimer’s. Although some drugs have been 
developed to ameliorate mild-to-moderate symptoms of the disease, these drugs do not alter the 
underlying disease process, and results from clinical trials for other drug candidates have thus far not 
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been promising.15 Moreover, while several risk factors for the disease have been identified—such as 
cardiovascular health, low levels of education, smoking, and depression—only a few randomized 
control trials have evaluated potential interventions affecting these risk factors and the resulting 
impact on AD prevalence. Thus far, no intervention has gained wide acceptance as effective.9,16 
Overall, the average Alzheimer’s patient lives about 8 years after symptoms appear, with survival 
ranging from 4 to 20 years.17 In short, the disease is difficult to detect, cannot be prevented, is 
essentially untreatable, and fatal. 
Worldwide, an estimated 33.9 million people are afflicted with Alzheimer’s disease; due to 
demographic shifts, prevalence is expected to triple over the next 40 years.16,18 Prevalence rates in 
Europe and the United States are some of the highest in the world, with an estimated 7 million and 
5.4 million people, respectively, suffering from the disease. 19–21 The World Health Organization 
ranks AD and other dementias as the fourth leading cause of death among high-income countries, 
and the annual direct and indirect costs attributable to Alzheimer’s and other dementias are 
estimated at roughly $234 billion in the European Union and $183 billion in the United States.18,19,22 
Steps towards a test for Alzheimer’s disease  
Medical testing for Alzheimer’s disease is not a new phenomenon. Genetic testing for 
Alzheimer’s disease has been available since 1994, offering patients a probabilistic measure of their 
risk for the disease. Genetics play an important role in the development of Alzheimer’s disease, 
particularly in the diagnosis of early-onset AD. Several potential risk genes have been identified for 
late-onset AD, with the apolipoprotein E (APOE) genotype accounting for most of the genetic risk 
in the development of the disease. Individuals with two ApoE ε4 alleles have more than seven times 
increased risk of developing AD than those with the ApoE ε3 allele.8,17  
 !5!
However, existing genetic tests analyzing apolipoprotein genotypes are inherently limited. 
The ApoE ε4 allele is neither a necessary nor sufficient predictor of the disease, meaning that people 
without this allele develop AD and not everyone with the allele does develop AD. 17 The association 
between ApoE ε4 allele and AD also varies by race and ethnicity.23,24 For these reasons and others—
including the test’s low sensitivity and specificity, the difficulty of interpreting probabilistic results, 
and the lack of prevention options—experts have largely opposed widespread clinical adoption of 
these genetic tests.25  
Efforts to develop additional medical tests for the early detection of AD continue. Work is 
underway to identify other susceptibility genes for AD, which could result in a more comprehensive 
set of predictive tests based on genetic makeup. Other initiatives have focused on emerging disease 
biomarkers— particularly those measuring changes in amyloid beta accumulation, synaptic and 
neuronal function, and brain structure—in hopes of developing tests that track pathophysiological 
changes related to the disease.26–30 If these new tests prove successful, it’s feasible that they could be 
incorporated into clinical practice and made broadly available. It is this possibility—that new genetic 
or biomarker tests could become available to the general public—that forms the basis for this paper. 
Health Belief Model 
  The Health Belief Model (HBM) is a theoretical framework developed by the U.S. Public 
Health Service in the 1950s to help explain low participation rates in disease prevention and early 
detection programs.7,31,32 The core premise of the model is that health behaviors are driven by 
personal beliefs about health conditions and the strategies available for their detection and 
treatment.31 In the past half century, the HBM has been applied in a range of fields to help 
determine the factors that best predict participation in health services, especially in assessments of 
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screening and testing programs for diseases such as Tay-Sachs, cancer, Huntington’s disease, cystic 
fibrosis, and Alzheimer’s disease. 33–37 
  There are two primary components of the model: perceptions of the disease and perceptions 
of relevant health behaviors.38,39 Perceptions of disease, also described as the “perceived threat,” 
include beliefs about both the severity of the disease and the individual’s susceptibility to the disease. 
Perceived threat captures the extent to which a person feels vulnerable to a particular health 
condition and thus is motivated to act on that feeling.7 Perceptions of behavior include beliefs about 
the tangible and psychological costs of, or barriers to, an action, weighed against its potential 
benefits, including the ability of the action to reduce risk or the condition’s impact on one’s life.40 A 
potential benefit of testing for a disease, for example, may be reduced uncertainty associated with 
being at-risk, whereas a potential cost may be discrimination.25,41,42 The Health Belief Model operates 
in a sequential fashion: perceptions of threat provide the “energy or force to act” while perceptions 
of behavior—taking into account perceived benefits and costs—provide “a preferred path to 
action.”43,44  
  It is worth noting that these perceptions are not always accurate, and may instead represent 
an over- or under-estimation of reality. While a person’s family history with a disease may provide an 
objective perception of risk for the disease, difficult personal experiences, heightened media 
attention, or an incomplete understanding of the disease’s trajectory could easily generate 
misperceptions regarding levels of risk regardless of actual genetic susceptibility. However, the 
literature demonstrates that it is the perception of risk—which reflects both accurate and inaccurate 
evaluations of risk—that shapes health behaviors, not the objective underlying risk. 
  The Health Belief Model accounts for two additional sets of variables that influence 
individuals’ perceptions and, in turn, their health behaviors. The first set includes cues to action, 
which consist of people, places or events that spur a behavior change. These can be internal, such as 
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the onset of a new symptom, or external, such as mass media campaigns, conversations, or physician 
reminders.45 These variables tend to be the least well formulated in studies and, thus, relatively little 
is known about their role in health behavior. The second set includes diverse demographic, 
structural, and psychological variables that can inform individuals’ views on their perceived threat 
and perceived costs and benefits of a particular action. These include age, race, education, 
knowledge of the disease, and other variables assessing coping styles and beliefs regarding self-
efficacy (confidence in one’s ability to take action).40  
  The present study draws on the Health Belief Model to inform our hypotheses about overall 
levels of interest in early medical testing for Alzheimer’s and the factors motivating individual 
responses, both positively and negatively.  
Hypotheses: Demand for Medical Care and Predictive Alzheimer’s Testing 
  The Health Belief Model reflects a rational, cognitive view of decision-making, with the 
assumption being that if the person feels threatened by a disease and simultaneously feels that the 
benefits of taking action outweighs the costs, then she or he will take action. 7,40  
  Perceived threat encompasses perceptions of both risk and severity. But with regards to 
interest in genetic testing, studies consistently find that these factors work in opposite directions: 
interest in genetic testing is associated with high levels of perceived risk, but with low levels of 
perceived severity.32,33,37,46  
  In a general population survey conducted in the United States, respondents with a family 
history of AD and respondents who had served as caregivers tended to show a strong inclination 
towards testing.47 Moreover, a study of first-degree relatives of AD patients found that level of 
concern, when incorporated into a larger variable capturing multiple dimensions of perceived threat, 
was predictive of desire for an AD genetic test.37!  
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  While high perceived risk predicts higher interest in testing, perceived disease severity has 
the opposite effect. One of the seminal studies on the health belief model showed a curvilinear 
relationship between utilization of testing for Tay-Sachs disease and perceptions of that condition’s 
severity, such that low perceptions of disease severity motivated participation whereas high 
perceptions of severity had an inhibiting effect.32 This pattern has been confirmed in other studies 
evaluating utilization of genetic testing. Studies find that rates of testing are much lower for 
conditions in which there is perceived to be no cure, no treatment, and no method of prevention, 
while testing rates are higher for conditions in which people think something can be done.41 For 
example, rates of genetic testing for hereditary forms of breast cancer, where a range of treatment 
options are available, are about 50% while rates of testing for incurable Huntington’s disease are 
about 10%.46,48  
  In our study, we measure perceived threat using two categories of variables. The first 
characterizes a respondent’s level of perceived risk. Our measures of perceived risk capture 
perceptions based on objective measures of risk—having a blood relative with AD—and subjective 
measures of risk borne from experience, such as whether the respondent served as a caregiver or 
decision-maker for person with AD, is “very” or “somewhat worried” about getting Alzheimer’s 
disease, and is in fair or poor health. These objective and subjective measures interact; for example, 
if a respondent has a family member with AD, she may be more worried about the disease. In this 
paper, we group these reports of objective and subjective factors together, arguing that it is the 
overall perception of threat that matters rather than the underlying reality. The second category of 
perceived threat focuses on the perceived severity of Alzheimer’s disease. For this, we ask 
respondents if they think Alzheimer’s disease is fatal. Drawing on previous findings, we expect that 
our measures of perceived risk will predict higher rates of interest in testing, but expect that 
knowledge of the disease’s fatality will predict lower rates of interest in testing. 34,36,47,49–52  
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Perceptions of costs and benefits of testing are also shown to affect both rates of expressed 
interest in testing and actual utilization of available tests. In studies of genetic testing for Alzheimer’s 
disease, cited benefits include having information available for purposes of future planning, such as 
signing advanced directives, resolving financial concerns, and purchasing long-term care insurance; 
being able to monitor developments in Alzheimer’s disease and treatment; and reducing levels of 
anxiety associated with AD risk.37,42,47,53,54 Perceived costs include potential social and economic 
discrimination; confidentiality; inability to cope with risk estimates; the financial cost of the test; and 
the lack of good treatment options.41,47,55,56 In our analysis, we include measures capturing several of 
these costs and benefits.  
In previous studies, individuals who underwent genetic testing for Alzheimer’s disease cited 
the need to prepare their spouses and families for the possibility of AD; therefore, we expect that 
individuals who are married are more likely to pursue testing.53,57 Similarly, since testing interest was 
positively associated with a desire to arrange future care options, we expect that individuals who 
anticipate relying on a hired caregiver in the case that they develop AD will be more likely to express 
interest in testing. Lastly, test utilization is associated with a desire for early access to treatment and 
prevention options; therefore, we anticipate that those who believe there is a treatment available 
now or that there will be one in the next five years—beliefs hereafter described as “treatment 
optimism”—will be more likely to express interest in testing.37,42 
In our models, we control for demographic variables such as age, gender, education, and 
country of residence that could influence levels of perceived risk and perceptions of test costs and 
benefits. We also control for race in models evaluating rates of interest in the United States. (The US 
was the only country for which race data were collected). The evidence is mixed on the predictive 
power of demographic variables on demand for medical testing.34,35,56 Across a range of conditions, 
including breast cancer, younger populations are generally more likely to express interest in and to 
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actually undergo genetic testing, which could be due to the earlier age of onset for these 
conditions.33,58 In studies on Alzheimer’s disease, age either has had no effect on interest in testing or 
had a positive but statistically insignificant relationship.37,47,49 However, in a trial for AD genetic 
testing, individuals who pursued testing were more likely to be aged 60 and younger.52 We anticipate 
that interest in testing will be greatest for middle-aged to older populations, given that these groups 
are closer to the age of onset and, in our sample, are more likely to serve as caregivers for AD 
patients.  
In terms of gender, studies of testing for other conditions find that women are more likely to 
undergo pre-symptomatic tests, carrier tests, and predisposition tests than men, which some suggest 
is due to differences in knowledge about health threats, differences in coping mechanisms, decisions 
related to childbearing, and a desire to pass information on to children.46,59 However, in a study of 
interest in genetic testing for AD among first-degree relatives, men expressed greater interest than 
women, which may indicate a divide between those who express interest and those who follow 
through with testing.37 Although the incidence of AD is similar across genders when accounting for 
age, women tend to live longer than men and are therefore more likely than men to develop 
Alzheimer’s disease. Thus, we expect that women will be more likely to pursue early medical testing 
for AD.  
The research on education is similarly variable. In surveys of interest in genetic testing for 
AD, respondents with the lowest education levels were more likely than their counterparts to report 
a willingness to undergo testing. 47,49 However, those with higher levels of education were generally 
more likely to pursue genetic testing for cystic fibrosis, Huntington’s disease (HD), and breast 
cancer, and to indicate a desire for AD testing once it becomes available.36,52,60–62 This dynamic is 
particularly troublesome since those with the lowest levels of education are actually at a higher risk 
of developing the disease.63 Evidence suggests that this educational difference could interact with 
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other socioeconomic conditions resulting in differences in knowledge about scientific advancements 
affecting the availability of early medical tests, access to testing technologies, and expectations about 
the test and its capabilities.34,58,64  
We expect that country of residence will result in significant differences in levels of interest 
in testing. A whole host of factors have been shown to contribute to cross-country differences in 
utilization rates for genetic testing, ranging from clinical, individual, and family-level factors to 
nationwide cultural and health system-related factors.65 We anticipate that cross-country differences 
in rates of interest for testing could reflect differences in understandings of health and this disease, 
clinical and social norms regarding an Alzheimer’s disease diagnosis, cultural acceptance of testing, 
differences in incidence rates, family structure and communication patterns between family 
members, ideologies surrounding patient autonomy and physician paternalism, and concerns about 
insurance and long-term care provision.46,59,63,66,67 While we control for some of these factors at an 
individual level, we expect that country of residence will simultaneously account for unspecified 
cultural and person-level differences as well as differences that are more concretely linked to political 
and economic factors. 
Race may predict interest in early medical testing for AD. For example, a survey of 
professionals conducted in the Southeastern part of the United States found that, in comparison to 
white respondents, African-Americans showed less interest in genetic testing for AD and endorsed 
fewer reasons for seeking testing; nevertheless, they anticipated fewer negative consequences from a 
positive result.68 Overall, these results are similar to those seen in testing for cystic fibrosis and 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancers, which found that whites were more likely to express interest 
in genetic testing, seek out genetic counseling, and undergo testing once available.36,57,58,69,70 However, 
a national telephone survey conducted in 2000 found that African-Americans and Latinos, in 
comparison to whites, were more likely to express interest in adult genetic testing for untreatable 
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conditions.48 Given this conflicting evidence, we have no clear hypothesis for the role of race in 
predicting interest in testing.  
Beyond demographic variables, we expect that other psychological factors, such as measures 
of self-efficacy and coping styles, will influence interest in early medical testing for AD. These 
measures account for some of the underlying emotional processing involved in decisions regarding 
health behaviors. In analyses of participants in HD genetic tests, researchers found that, compared 
to the general population, those who underwent testing were a self-selected group who believed that 
they were better equipped to handle bad news, had strong mental resources, and were less 
pessimistic about the impact of a test result.61,71–73 Those who chose not to get tested scored higher 
on depressive and hopelessness scales, and/or viewed themselves as more psychologically vulnerable 
to potential consequences, such as fear, depression, and inability to cope with unfavorable 
results.41,61,74  
  People who underwent asymptomatic testing also had better coping strategies. According to 
one predominant theory, people typically fall into one of two camps: monitors and blunters.75 
Monitors include those seek out information when confronting a threatening situation, whereas 
blunters avoid it or distract themselves away from the stressor. Distraction enables at-risk persons to 
avoid confronting painful or anxiety-provoking feelings about a disease or his or her risk of 
contracting the disease.72 Populations that sought out genetic testing for Huntington’s showed more 
active problem solving, sought out social support, and consoled themselves with comforting and 
optimistic thoughts.35 This “information-seeking style” is characteristic of monitors, and predicts 
useful coping abilities.  
In our survey, we ask respondents whether they would visit a doctor if exhibiting confusion 
or memory loss, which are symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease. We expect that those who demonstrate 
a more active information-gathering style, i.e. those who are willing to go to a doctor if showing 
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symptoms, will seek out AD testing, whereas those who respond negatively, potentially showing 
signs of avoidance, will not express interest in AD testing. 
Study Data and Analysis !
Data Sources 
The data for this paper come from an international telephone survey with a randomly-
selected sample of 2,678 adult respondents age 18 and older, drawn from five countries: France, 
Germany, Poland, Spain, and the United States. The Harvard School of Public Health and 
Alzheimer Europe commissioned the survey to assess public understanding about Alzheimer’s 
disease. The fieldwork was conducted from February 7 to 27, 2011 by TNS, which is an independent 
research company based in London with branches in each of the five countries surveyed. TNS is 
one of the largest survey research companies in the world, and conducts the Eurobarometer surveys 
of adults in the European Union for the European Commission. In each of the five countries, 
interviews were conducted both by landline telephone using random-digit dialing and by cell phone 
using numbers chosen randomly from a list of cell phone numbers across the country among adults 
age 18 and older. Interviews were conducted in the language of each country. In the United States, 
interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish. The average length of an interview was 12 
minutes. 
The survey, which has been described elsewhere, focused on eight broad topics, ranging 
from relative public concern about the disease to public beliefs about whether an effective treatment 
is available to slow the progression of the disease.6 In this analysis, we focus on results related to 
interest in future early diagnostic testing for the disease, should such a test become available.  
The following table (Table 1.1) shows interview dates, sample sizes, and margins of error at 
the 95% confidence interval for each country.  
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Table 1.1 Sample Sizes for Surveyed Countries  
  Interview dates Total interviews 
Margin of error 
(percentage 
points) 
France February 7–14, 2011 529 +/-4.3 
Germany February 7–19, 2011 499 +/-4.4 
Poland February 7–10, 2011 509 +/-4.3 
Spain February 8–13, 2011 502 +/-4.4 
U.S. February 7–27, 2011 639 +/-3.9 
 
Interest in Early Medical Testing 
This analysis evaluates the likelihood that a respondent indicates that he or she will pursue 
early medical testing for Alzheimer’s disease if it is available in the future. The relevant survey 
question begins with the statement, “[i]n the future, a medical test might become available that 
would tell people before they had symptoms whether they will get Alzheimer’s disease in the 
future.” The question then asks, “If such a test became available, how likely do you think it is that 
you would get the test—“very likely”, “somewhat likely”, “not too likely”, or “not at all likely”?”  
In overall assessments of potential interest, we include respondents who are either “very 
likely” or “somewhat likely” to seek testing. However, because literature suggests that take-up rates 
tend to be lower than rates of expressed interest once tests are actually available, our regression 
analysis pays particular attention to those who report being “very likely” to get the test, since these 
respondents are likely the group most motivated to obtain testing.41 Similarly, we anticipate that 
those who report being “not at all likely” to obtain the test may reflect the views of people who 
would never seek out an AD test or accept it when offered. Therefore, we also use regression 
analysis to compare the characteristics of this “not at all likely” group to the rest of the sample. We 
created two dichotomous outcome variables, with the first coded as “very likely” = 1; 
“somewhat/not too/not at all likely” = 0 and the second coded as “not at all likely”=1; “not 
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too/somewhat/”very likely””=0. We dropped the “Don’t know/Refused” respondents, of whom 
there were 53, from the analysis.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this analysis were drawn from the survey and include 
beliefs and attitudes about Alzheimer’s disease, indicators of perceived costs and benefits, and other 
demographic and psychological factors that could affect views of the disease. We collected data on 
income and education, both of which serve as useful indicators of socioeconomic status; however, 
since the two are strongly correlated (r= 0.394, p<0.05), we only use education in our analysis. The 
coding and units for each of these variables is included in the Appendix. Race and ethnicity data was 
only collected for respondents in the United States, so models evaluating its impact are conducted 
for respondents living in that country only. 
Analysis  
To evaluate the hypotheses described above, we analyzed both the unadjusted and adjusted 
relationships between the outcome and independent variables included in these analyses. For the 
unadjusted bivariate relationships, we used chi-square tests to evaluate statistical significance, which 
we assessed at the conventional alpha level of p<.05. We then employed logistic regression models 
to estimate mean levels of interest in early medical testing for AD and the factors associated with 
high and low levels of interest. We estimated a series of models, beginning with variables measuring 
respondents’ perceived threat and perceived costs and benefits. We then systematically added in 
additional control variables, assessing the models using differences in log-likelihood measures. Only 
the final models are shown in this analysis. As recommended in the literature, we did not aggregate 
items measuring the constructs of the health belief model, despite some measures being moderately 
interrelated, and instead evaluated the impact of each measure separately.44 However, we did check 
 !16!
for interactions between these variables to see if they enriched our understanding of the factors 
motivating interest in testing. As robustness checks, we ran country-specific regression models to 
check for between-country variation, and evaluated all models using probit regression. 
 Nonresponse in telephone surveys produces some known biases in survey-derived estimates 
because participation tends to vary for different population subgroups. To compensate for these 
known biases, the sample data are weighted to reflect the actual composition of the adult population 
in the surveyed countries, calculated on the basis of census data from each country, according to 
race/ethnicity (U.S. only), age, gender, and region. The sample data are also weighted by telephone 
status (landline, cell). Other techniques, such as systematic respondent selection within households 
and callbacks staggered over times of days and days of weeks, were used to help ensure that the 
sample in each country is representative. In our bivariate results, we present weighted percentages. 
After the weighting, the results for each country are generalizable to the adult population of that 
country.6 All analyses were conducted using Stata 11 software.!
Limitations !
Imprecise wording in our survey may mean that we have overestimated underlying levels of 
interest in testing. As noted above, the survey asks: 
“[i]n the future, a medical test might become available that would tell people before they had 
symptoms whether they will get Alzheimer’s disease in the future. If such a test became 
available, how likely do you think it is that you would get the test—“very likely”, “somewhat 
likely”, “not too likely”, or “not at all likely”?”  
 
This phrasing presents several problems. First, the phrase “in the future” is used twice: to 
describe both the potential existence of an early medical test for Alzheimer’s, and to refer to the 
possibility that the respondent will get Alzheimer’s disease later in life. Therefore, our results 
encapsulate respondents’ beliefs about the timing and availability of such a test, their interest in the 
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actual test, and their level of concern for events that may happen in the future. The use of the word 
“might” in the first part of the question (“a medical test might become available”) compounds the 
possible variance based on respondents’ beliefs about the likelihood of such a test coming becoming 
a reality. In our regression models, we attempt to focus in on interest in testing by controlling for 
treatment optimism, levels of concern about getting Alzheimer’s disease, and age. Future research, 
however, could more effectively eliminate variance associated with respondents’ views on scientific 
advancement by rewording the survey question, creating a hypothetical situation in which the test 
already exists. 
Another potential issue with the question is that it implies that the test would be completely 
predictive and highly effective: the imagined test “would tell people before they had symptoms 
whether they will get Alzheimer’s disease in the future.” In reality, such a test might tell people that 
they were at greater than average risk to get AD, without predicting it with certainty. Interest in a 
probabilistic test might be lower than the interest expressed by our respondents. 
Moreover, we do not include potentially relevant financial, social, and emotional variables, 
such as respondents’ insurance status, willingness to pay for testing, concerns about test 
administration procedures, family size, country-level policies, AD media coverage, level of religiosity, 
history of depression, or fear of discrimination in the survey. Future research could delve more 
deeply into the roles that these variables play in predicting interest in testing. Future surveys could 
also benefit by including variables capturing the role of personal motivations and personality 
dispositions by using more refined measures of perceived costs and benefits, such as those used in 
earlier analyses of genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer, and measures of psychological style, 
including the Miller Behavioral Style Scale.  
One factor not directly included in the Health Belief Model is the role of fear in predicting 
interest and utilization of AD testing. However, previous work on mammography screening finds 
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that levels of perceived risk help predict levels of fear.40 Therefore, while we do not explicitly 
account for fear in the present analysis, we believe that our measures of perceived risk do control for 
some of the effects that fear might have in this study. Future analyses on early medical testing for 
AD could include more direct measures of fear as well as other emotional dimensions of health 
behavior. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.2 displays levels of interest by our respondents in early medical testing for 
Alzheimer’s disease, as well as weighted statistics on measures of perceived threat, costs and benefits 
of testing, demographics, and psychological status. In our survey, roughly a third of all survey 
respondents (30.0%) report that they would be “very likely” to get the test, whereas slightly more 
than a tenth (11.93%) reported being “not at all likely” to pursue testing. Our estimates for those 
who would be “very likely” to get an early medical test for AD fall roughly in line with results from a 
randomized clinical trial published in 2004, which found that the take-up rate for genetic testing for 
Alzheimer’s disease was 24% among contacted participants.52 If we combine respondents who are 
“very likely” and those who are “somewhat likely” to obtain the test (36.98% of respondents), about 
67% of adults in our survey report that they would obtain an early medical test for Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
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Table 1.2 Frequency (%) tables of support for early medical testing for Alzheimer's disease by response 
categories and social and demographic groups 
    Entire Sample Very likely to get early medical test for AD  
Not at all likely to 
get early medical test 
for AD 
Entire sample ! ! 30.00% [28.1-31.9] 11.93% [6.4-21.1] 
Have/had immediate blood 
relative with AD 
! ! ! ! ! !! No 77.10% [75.2-79.0] 27.8%*** [25.7-30.1] 12.30% [6.5-22.2] ! Yes 22.90% [21.0-24.8] 35.30% [31.2-39.7] 11.20% [6.3-18.9] 
Served as decision-maker or 
caretaker for AD patient 
! ! ! ! ! !! No 83.00% [81.4-84.7] 27.9%* [25.8-30.0] 12.7%** [7.1-21.8] ! Yes 17.00% [15.3-18.6] 40.40% [35.6-45.5] 8.10% [3.4-18.1] 
Worried will get Alzheimer's 
disease 
! ! ! ! ! !! Not too/not at all/don't 
know/refused 55.30% [53.1-57.5] 23.5%** [21.2-26.0] 15.5%* [7.8-28.5] ! Very/somewhat worried 44.70% [42.5-46.9] 38.10% [35.1-41.2] 7.40% [4.7-11.7] 
Health status ! ! ! ! ! !! Fair/poor 20.30% [18.5-22.2] 34%* [29.8-38.4] 12.10% [6.4-21.4] ! Excellent/very good/good 79.70% [77.8-81.5] 28.90% [26.8-31.1] 11.80% [5.8-22.4] 
Think AD is fatal ! ! ! ! ! !! No/Don't know/refused 55.50% [53.3-57.7] 28.90% [26.4-31.5] 12.00% [5.9-22.8] ! Yes 44.50% [42.3-46.7] 31.40% [28.6-34.4] 11.90% [6.2-21.7] 
Marital status  ! ! ! ! ! !! No 46.30% [44.1-48.6] 28.90% [26.1-31.9] 12.20% [6.6-21.3] ! Yes 53.70% [51.4-55.9] 30.90% [28.4-33.6] 11.70% [6.0-21.7] 
Expect paid caregiver to be 
primary caretaker if develop AD 
! ! ! ! ! !! No 70.80% [68.7-72.8] 28.6%* [26.3-30.9] 11.20% [6.1-19.6] ! Yes 29.20% [27.2-31.3] 33.40% [29.8-37.2] 13.20% [6.6-24.5] 
Believe an effective AD 
treatment is available now or will 
be in 5 years 
! ! ! ! ! !
! No/don't know/refused 32.10% [30.0-34.2] 28.50% [25.3-32.0] 14.3%* [8.1-24.1] ! Yes 67.90% [65.8-70.0] 30.80% [28.4-33.2] 10.60% [5.4-19.9] 
Age  ! ! ! ! ! !! 18-29 23.70% [21.7-25.8] 25.3%** [21.3-29.9] 10.50% [6.0-17.6] ! 30-49 37.20% [35.1-39.4] 25.10% [22.2-28.2] 13.30% [5.6-28.5] ! 50-64 21.60% [19.9-23.3] 36.90% [33.1-40.9] 11.50% [5.8-21.4] ! 65-74 11.60% [10.2-13.0] 38.90% [33.2-45.0] 10.10% [6.2-16.0] ! 75-85+ 5.90% [4.9-6.9] 34.30% [27.0-42.3] 13.90% [7.4-24.5] !        
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Table  1.2  (Continued) 
Gender       ! Male 48.20% [46.0-50.5] 27.7%* [24.9-30.5] 12.30% [6.7-21.4] ! Female 51.80% [49.5-54.0] 32.20% [29.6-34.9] 11.60% [6.0-21.2] 
Educational attainment ! ! ! ! ! !! Low 32.50% [30.4-34.6] 32.4%* [29.0-35.9] 11.20% [7.3-17.0] ! Middle 30.20% [28.1-32.3] 32.10% [28.6-35.9] 11.30% [5.7-20.9] ! High 37.30% [35.1-39.5] 25.90% [23.0-29.0] 13.10% [6.0-26.4] 
Country ! ! ! ! ! !! France 20.80% [19.0-22.6] 26.8%*** [22.9-31.2] 9.6%*** [7.0-12.2] ! Germany 17.90% [16.2-19.7] 23.60% [19.7-28.0] 19.80% [15.8-23.7] ! Poland 17.80% [16.1-19.5] 30.50% [26.2-35.2] 5.20% [3.2-7.1] ! Spain 18.40% [16.6-20.1] 39.60% [34.9-44.4] 8.20% [5.6-10.8] ! United States 25.10% [23.1-27.0] 29.70% [26.0-33.7] 15.80% [12.7-18.9] 
Would see doctor if showing 
symptoms of AD 
! ! ! ! ! !! No 9.20% [7.8-10.5] 19%** [13.3-26.6] 19.5%* [11.1-32.1] ! Yes 90.80% [89.5-92.2] 31.40% [29.4-33.5] 11.20% [5.8-20.6] 
Note: N=2,678; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 using chi-square tests of differences between expected and 
observed distributions. Sample sizes vary across categories due to missing data. Confidence intervals in 
brackets. 
 
Across all measures, we find broad support for our initial hypothesis that individuals who 
report high levels of perceived risk are more likely than those with low levels of risk to report that 
they are “very likely” to undergo testing. For example, we find that 35.3% of respondents who have 
had an immediate blood relative diagnosed with AD report that they “very likely” to get tested, as 
compared to 27.8% without a blood relative with AD. Similar patterns emerge for those who have 
served as a caretaker or decision-maker for person with AD (40.4% versus 27.9%) and for those 
who state that they are “very” or “somewhat” worried about getting AD (38.1% versus 23.5%). 
Those reporting “fair” or “poor” health status were also more likely than those with “excellent” to 
“good” health ratings to express interest in testing (34% versus 28.9%).  
Unexpectedly, we find that our measure of perceived severity—knowing that AD is a fatal 
condition—had no statistically significant relationship to interest in testing.  
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Also, contrary to previous studies on rates of genetic testing for AD, we found only one 
statistically significant relationship between positive interest in early medical testing for AD and 
measures of perceived costs and benefits.37 Those who expected to rely on a paid caregiver in the 
instance that they develop AD, as opposed to a spouse, child, friend or other, were more likely to be 
among those expressing strong interest in testing—a modest but significant difference (33.4% versus 
28.6%). Other measures, such as marital status and treatment optimism, had no significant 
association with being “very likely” to get tested, although the direction of the association was as 
expected.  
Older populations more often than younger populations report that they are “very likely” to 
get an early AD test (38.9% for 65-74 year olds versus 25.3% for 18-29 year olds); women are more 
interested than men (32.2% versus 27.7%); and those with the lowest levels of education are more 
interested than those with the highest (32.4% versus 25.9%). Across the five countries in our 
sample, Spain and Poland had the highest shares of respondents reporting that they are “very likely” 
to pursue testing (39.6% and 30.5%), and Germany the lowest (23.6%). Lastly, self-efficacy and 
coping styles affected rates of interest. Those with more active information-seeking styles were more 
likely to express interest in testing.  
In the United States, whites were less likely than blacks and Hispanics to respond that they’d 
be “very likely” to get an early medical test for AD, and the differences were dramatic (25.3% 
compared to 45.1% and 34.6%, respectively). However, only the difference between whites and 
blacks was statistically significant in these bivariate analyses.  
In our bivariate analyses of respondents who are “not at all likely” to get AD tests, our 
results (not shown) only vary slightly from what we would expect given the above results. 
Interestingly, we find that those who believed there currently was a treatment for AD or that one 
would become available in the next five years were less likely to respond that they were “not at all 
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likely” to get tested (10.5% versus 14.10%). This suggests that while treatment optimism may not 
motivate people to express strong interest in testing, it does prevent people from ruling out testing 
all together.  
Many of our measures of perceived threat are also significantly related to measures of 
perceived costs and benefits, as well as the other demographic and social characteristics included in 
our model. For example, women and caretakers are more likely to report being worried about 
getting AD, and having a close blood relative with AD is positively correlated with higher levels of 
treatment optimism. To disentangle the impact of our key independent variables on levels of interest 
in testing, we use multivariate logistic regression and check for potential interactions between these 
variables.  
Regression Results 
Logistic regression results confirm many of the findings in our descriptive analysis (Table 
1.3). On average, after controlling for social and demographic factors, we find that 28.4% of survey 
respondents are “very likely” to get an early medical test for AD if and when it is available in the 
future.  
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Table 1.3 Logistic Regression Results Evaluating Variables Predictive of Being "Very Likely" 
to Get Early Medical Test for Alzheimer’s Disease  
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Variables 
  Measures of Perceived Threat 
  
 
Respondent is or was decision-maker or 
caretaker for AD patient 1.306* 1.330* 
 
Worried will get Alzheimer's 1.760*** 1.22 
 
"Excellent/Good/Very Good" Health Status 0.972 0.763 
 
Worried*Excellent/Good/Very Good 
Health Status — 1.610* 
 
Have/had immediate blood relative with AD 1.312* 0.971 
 
Think AD is fatal 1.112 0.96 
 
Immediate blood relative*Think AD is fatal — 1.783* 
Measures of Perceived Costs and Benefits 
  
 
Marital status of respondent 0.963 0.977 
 
Expect paid caregiver to be primary caretaker 
if develop AD 1.277* 1.291* 
 
Believe an effective AD treatment is available 
now or will be in 5 years 1.064 1.051 
Demographic Controls 
  
 
Age of Respondent 
  
 
     30-49 1.019 1.019 
 
     50-64 1.573** 1.582** 
 
     65-74 1.702** 1.733** 
 
     75-85+ 1.465 1.489+ 
 
Female 1.18 1.178 
 
Educational Attainment 
  
 
     Middle education 1.112 1.105 
 
     High education 0.846 0.844 
 
Country of Residence 
  
 
     Germany 0.838 0.841 
 
     Poland 1.568** 1.559* 
 
     Spain 1.463* 1.463* 
 
     United States 1.208 1.206 
Measure of Psychological Status 
  
 
Would see doctor if showing symptoms of 
AD 1.44 1.416 
Note: Table displays adjusted odds ratio; reference groups, in order of the categories 
displayed in the table are: Ages 18-29; Low Education; France; * p<0.05,** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001.  
 
In all of our models, measures of perceived risk are the strongest predictors of interest in 
testing. For example, in Model 1, holding all else constant, the odds of being “very likely” to pursue 
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testing are 76% higher for those worried about developing AD than for those not worried. As in our 
bivariate analyses, knowing the disease is fatal had no statistically significant effect on interest in 
testing (OR=1.112, P>0.05). Expecting to rely on a paid caregiver as opposed to spouse, family 
member, or friend remained the only measure of perceived costs and benefits that was positively 
associated with testing (OR=1.277, p<0.05). Older age (aged 50 and above) and country of 
residence also remain positive, statistically significant predictors of being interested in early medical 
testing.  
When we test for interactions between variables (Model 2), we find two interesting changes. 
First, knowledge of the disease’s fatality does seem to matter for those at highest risk of the disease: 
among those who know the disease is fatal, the predicted probability of expressing interest in testing 
is far higher for those who have a blood relative with AD as opposed to those without (38.7% 
versus 26.8%).  
Second, whereas poor health status is predictive of interest in testing in our bivariate 
analyses, it is the worried well who express higher levels of interest in our final model. Among those 
who are worried about AD, those in better health are more likely than those in worse health to 
desire testing (predicted probabilities of 36.3% versus 31.9%).  
 In Table 1.4, we evaluate country-level results and find largely similar patterns across 
measures of perceived threat and decision balance. For example, across all countries, respondents 
who were worried about getting AD were much more likely to express interest in testing, after 
accounting for other social and demographic variables. Similarly, caretakers, especially those in 
Poland, report higher interest in testing as opposed to those who have not served as a caretaker or 
decision-maker for an AD patient (OR=2.717, p<0.001). Single respondents in the United States 
were more likely than married respondents to report a desire for the test. In all other countries, 
marital status was not a significant predictor. However, since we did not include clinical or policy-
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level variables that are likely to affect country-level results, these models have limited explanatory 
value. 
We also explore factors predicting being “not at all likely” to pursue early medical testing, 
and find one notable variation from the above results (analyses not shown). While having a positive 
information-seeking style—as measured by answering that they would visit a physician if exhibiting 
symptoms of Alzheimer’s—had no effect on positive interest in testing, it is inversely related to 
expressing no interest in testing (OR=0.534, p<0.01). Not surprisingly, this suggests that those who 
would avoid physician visits are also more likely to avoid early medical testing. 
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Table 1.4 Logistic Regression Results Evaluating Variables Predictive of Being "Very Likely" to 
Get Early Medical Test for AD 
Variable Entire 
Sample 
France Germany Poland Spain United 
States 
Measures of Perceived Threat       
 Have/had immediate 
blood relative with AD 
1.312* 
(0.165) 
1.194 
(0.336) 
1.042 
(0.340) 
1.739 
(0.624) 
1.386 
(0.389) 
1.411 
(0.325) 
 Respondent is or was 
decision-maker or caretaker 
for AD patient 
1.306* 
(0.175) 
1.065 
(0.362) 
0.973 
(0.363) 
2.717** 
(0.977) 
1.170 
(0.307) 
1.066 
(0.288) 
 Worried will get 
Alzheimer's 
1.760*** 
(0.203) 
2.982*** 
(0.755) 
1.647+ 
(0.469) 
1.055 
(0.320) 
1.594 
(0.476) 
1.979** 
(0.432) 
 Think AD is fatal 1.112 
(0.117) 
1.332 
(0.302) 
1.271 
(0.346) 
0.758 
(0.204) 
1.329 
(0.316) 
0.907 
(0.196) 
 "Excellent/Good/Very 
Good" Health Status 
0.972 
(0.125) 
0.814 
(0.261) 
0.969 
(0.352) 
1.028 
(0.308) 
1.016 
(0.306) 
0.923 
(0.231) 
Measures of Perceived Costs 
and Benefits       
 Marital status of 
respondent 
0.963 
(0.113) 
1.445 
(0.397) 
1.383 
(0.428) 
0.601 
(0.191) 
1.393 
(0.382) 
0.641* 
(0.142) 
 Expect paid caregiver to be 
primary caretaker if 
develop AD 
1.277* 
(0.146) 
0.936 
(0.228) 
1.991* 
(0.561) 
1.893+ 
(0.650) 
1.359 
(0.327) 
1.001 
(0.224) 
 Believe an effective AD 
treatment is available now 
or will be in 5 years 
1.064 
(0.118) 
1.090 
(0.276) 
0.920 
(0.251) 
1.196 
(0.339) 
1.057 
(0.242) 
1.173 
(0.277) 
Age of Respondent 
       30-49 1.019 
(0.165) 
1.558 
(0.578) 
2.491+ 
(1.370) 
1.476 
(0.595) 
0.544+ 
(0.189) 
0.677 
(0.221) 
 50-64 1.573** 
(0.270) 
1.291 
(0.563) 
3.494* 
(2.077) 
3.649** 
(1.529) 
0.827 
(0.329) 
1.291 
(0.417) 
 65-74 1.702** 
(0.345) 
2.670* 
(1.241) 
2.762 
(1.887) 
2.865* 
(1.411) 
0.966 
(0.443) 
1.322 
(0.510) 
 75-85+ 1.465 
(0.352) 
3.191* 
(1.757) 
2.704 
(1.741) 
1.452 
(0.969) 
0.584 
(0.395) 
1.237 
(0.518) 
Gender 
      
 Female 1.180 
(0.123) 
1.035 
(0.241) 
0.944 
(0.261) 
1.342 
(0.358) 
1.090 
(0.245) 
1.247 
(0.268) 
Educational Attainment 
      
 Middle education 1.112 
(0.144) 
0.882 
(0.270) 
0.800 
(0.264) 
1.491 
(0.460) 
1.476 
(0.412) 
0.902 
(0.238) 
 High education 0.846 
(0.109) 
0.853 
(0.261) 
0.576+ 
(0.182) 
0.813 
(0.267) 
0.976 
(0.279) 
0.943 
(0.236) 
       
       ! !
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Country of Residence 
           
 Germany 0.838 
(0.147)           
 Poland 1.568** 
(0.271)           
 Spain 1.463* 
(0.235)           
 United States 1.208 
(0.192)           
Measure of Psychological 
Status       
 Would see doctor if 
showing symptoms of AD 
1.440 
(0.341) 
0.903 
(0.407) 
1.055 
(0.569) 
1.695 
(0.844) 
3.711+ 
(2.857) 
1.398 
(0.631) 
Observations 2357 494 423 419 436 585 
Wald test  110.47 33.44 23.48 50.6 21.13 34.21 
P-value 0 0.007 0.102 0 0.174 0.005 
Notes: +p<0.10,* p<0.05,** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Table displays adjusted odds ratios and 
standard errors in parentheses. Country-level sample sizes are reduced due to missing data. 
Reference groups, in order of the categories displayed in the table are: Ages 18-29; Low 
Education; France 
  
The Impact of Race and Ethnicity in the United States 
In the United States, we ran a separate analysis to consider the additional effects of race and 
ethnicity (Table 1.5). Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to report an interest in 
testing, adjusting for levels of perceived threat, costs and benefits, and demographic differences. The 
predicted probability of pursuing an early medical test for AD for whites was 23.1%, but it was 
nearly double that for blacks (41.3%) and 35.3% for Hispanics. There were no significant differences 
between minority groups on rates of interest.  
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Table 1.5 Logistic Regression Results Evaluating Variables Predictive of 
Being "Very Likely" to Get in Early Medical Test for AD in the United 
States 
Variable US 
Predicted 
Probability 
Race 
  
 
White 1.000 (--) 23.1% 
 
African American 
2.391** 
(0.689) 41.8% 
 
Hispanic 1.820* (0.499) 35.4% 
 
Other (Asian, Native American, or 
Other) 2.259 (1.297) 40.5% 
Observations 585 
 Notes: +p<0.10,* p<0.05,** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Table displays 
adjusted odds ratios and standard errors in parentheses. White is the 
reference category. Sample size is reduced due to missing data. Model 
controls for measures of perceived threat, perceived costs and benefits, 
demographic controls, and measure of psychological status. 
Discussion 
This is the first large, international, randomized survey of public interest in early medical 
testing for Alzheimer’s disease. We find that, on average, after controlling for a number of social and 
demographic factors, three out of ten respondents would be “very likely” to get an early medical test 
for Alzheimer’s disease if such a test were available in the future. Adding in respondents who are 
“somewhat likely,” the figure rises to two out of three. These robust rates of interest complement 
Neumann et al.’s 2011 study on predictive testing in the United States, which also finds high levels 
of interest in and willingness to pay for Alzheimer’s disease testing (between 70% and 74.8% of 
respondents reported that they would take an Alzheimer’s disease).76 
In line with earlier work, our results suggest that demand will be highest among those who 
perceive themselves to be at risk for the disease—including those with a family history of AD, those 
worried about getting the disease, and those who serve as caregivers or decision-makers for AD 
patients.33,37,46,47 While our own study does not directly ask about motivation for test-taking, studies 
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of other late-onset disorders find that those with high levels of perceived risk view testing as a way 
of coping with their worry, gaining control, and getting clarity about their future.32,71 
We hypothesized that, per previous literature on the effect of perceived severity, knowledge 
that the AD is fatal would reduce interest in testing. In our study, however, such knowledge had no 
significant effect for respondents without a blood relative with Alzheimer’s disease. Among 
respondents who did have such a blood relative, knowledge of the disease’s fatality actually increased 
interest in testing. Moreover, in three of our countries (France, Poland, and Spain), having a family 
member with AD led to increased awareness of the disease’s fatality.6 As prevalance grows, 
experience of afflicted family members widens, and awareness of AD increases, we may see interest 
in testing rise correspondingly.  
However, large numbers of respondents in our do not believe that Alzheimer’s diease is 
fatal;  but having a family member with AD increased this awareness in three of our five countries—
France, Poland, and Spain. If educational campaigns improved levels of awareness in these 
countries, we may see even higher rates of interet in testing among family members of AD patients. 
Only one of our measures of perceived costs and benefits affected rates of interest in 
testing—whether a respondent anticipated needing to rely on a paid caregiver.  In our sample, these 
respondents were more likely to be female and single. These results highlight how aging needs and 
expectations can vary across gender and individual family circumstances. Although future work is 
needed in this area, these results affirm earlier work showing that people seek out testing in order to 
prepare for the future, especially since long-term care arrangements can be costly and logistically 
complicated to arrange.  
Country-level variation was significant. Interest was highest in Poland, where support 
systems for AD patients are more fragmented and thus planning for care falls to individuals, and in 
Spain, where informal care giving is more common and AD-related media has been more 
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prevalent.77 For example, at the time of our survey, two popular films were released in Spain 
addressing Alzheimer’s disease and its impact on caregivers.i It is unclear whether our results for 
Spain reflect this increase in attention or whether the popularity of the films reflects the same levels 
of concern we find in our survey. Compounding these factors, we expect interest and utilization of 
early medical testing for AD across countries to be affected by variations in clinical practice, care 
resources, cultural norms, disease epidemiology, levels of disease awareness, and public policy 
responses.59,63  
Demographically, we find that, on average, middle- to older-age populations—who are both 
closer to the age of onset and more likely to serve as caretakers—are also more likely to express 
interest in testing.52 Looking forward, as global populations age and as more people gain experience 
with the disease, demand for early medical AD testing could rise.  
In the United States, race and ethnicity were strong predictors of interest in testing. Contrary 
to most of the literature on AD testing, we found that on average, blacks and Hispanics were more 
likely than whites to desire testing for AD, adjusting for differences in knowledge of disease, 
perceptions of risk, and other demographic differences. However, experience with other tests 
suggests that actual take-up may be lower among black and Hispanic populations than expressed 
interest would indicate. Looking ahead, if a test becomes available, clinicians, lawmakers, and 
advocates should pay close attention to the individual factors, such as perceptions about Alzheimer’s 
disease, and structural issues that could depress rates of take-up for early medical testing in these 
communities.78,79 Potential structural barriers include racial inequalities in rates of health insurance 
coverage, access to primary care, and preventive services; perceptions regarding historical patterns of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i The two films were 'Bicicleta, cullera, poma', a 2010 film about a well-known Spanish politician 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, and 'Cuidadores', los héroes anónimos’, a 2011 film about 
caregivers for Alzheimer’s patients. 
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mistreatment of minorities in medical research; and documented tendencies among physicians 
serving minority populations to less-frequently order or refer patients for genetic testing for 
conditions such as breast cancer, colorectal cancer, Huntington’s disease, and others in comparison 
to those serving fewer minority patients.48,80,81  
The same question applies more broadly: will levels of interest in testing, as expressed in our 
survey, match rates of take-up once and if a test becomes available? In earlier analyses of genetic 
testing, test uptake has been much lower than expressed interest, particularly for fatal conditions for 
which nothing can be done, such as Huntington’s disease.32,46 However, because AD is more 
prevalent than Huntington’s disease, has a later age of onset, has greater advocacy support, and 
garners more media attention, we believe uptake for AD tests will be relatively high. In fact, rates of 
interest among survey respondents who are “very likely” to pursue testing in our survey are 
comparable to participation rates in a clinical trial of AD genetic testing in the United States.52  
Transforming Medical, Political, and Legal Landscapes 
If an early diagnostic test is indeed developed and our predictions are correct about demand, 
millions of people in each of the studied countries will become members of a new population group: 
asymptomatic adults living with a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. Consequently, policymakers and 
clinicians should expect significant changes in the utilization of medical and economic resources and 
address potential legal obstacles. In the medical realm, diagnosed but asymptomatic individuals are 
likely to press for follow-up testing, ongoing medical monitoring, and medical management of 
potential complications associated with Alzheimer’s disease.82 Given the uncertainty around the 
disease’s pathogenesis and treatment mechanisms, the clinical value of such tests is unclear. 
Moreover, increased demand for early intervention and support services could strain already-
overburdened health systems, making the tradeoffs involved in allocating medical resources even 
 !32!
more difficult. These costs would be in addition to the already daunting estimates projected for 
long-term care needs over the next forty years.19,77  
However, Neumann et al. found that even in circumstances where no treatment is available, 
respondents valued testing because of it’s ability to provide useful information regarding disease 
status or predisposition, either in the form of reassurance to those who are negative or certainty for 
those who are positive. Moreover, respondents reported that test results could inform health and 
non-health behavior changes, such as seeking out second opinions, signing advanced directives, and 
spending more time with family and friends.76 Policymakers should consider the non-clinical value of 
these tests in their assessments of coverage in the years ahead. 
In the legal realm, early medical testing raises challenging questions related to testing 
protocols, disclosure practices, confidentiality protections, discrimination, and the availability of 
follow-up care.83 For example, policymakers will have to gauge the financial and psychological costs 
of early diagnosis against the research benefits of endorsing a broad-based screening program for an 
incurable, fatal condition such as AD. While such an effort could advance research towards a cure, it 
could endanger those who might be psychologically vulnerable to test results.  
If a test is developed, fear of employment and insurance discrimination could remain a 
barrier to participation. For instance, when hiring, employers may want to discriminate against 
diagnosed but asymptomatic individuals for fear that over time they would more frequently be 
absent from work, less productive on the job, and require more extensive health services.84 This may 
be less of an issue since the age of onset is typically after age 65 for most AD patients, but it remains 
an issue for those with early onset AD, which can affect people in their 30s, 40s, and 50s. 
Similarly, insurers—including health, life, disability, or long-term care insurers—may want 
access to private health information to protect against adverse selection. These desires are not 
unreasonable. In the United States, one study found that individuals who underwent genetic testing 
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for Alzheimer’s disease were five times more likely than those who were untested to change their 
long-term care insurance coverage in the year following testing.54 However, if undergoing a test for 
Alzheimer’s could endanger one’s ability to buy insurance, such privacy issues may depress testing 
rates. 
The US and Europe have enacted a range of laws and treaties with measures protecting 
individuals against employment and insurance discrimination on the basis of genetic information and 
protecting private medical information, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
in the US and the 1999 Oviedo Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine in Europe. 
However, research suggests that the laws protecting against genetic discrimination in Europe have 
had mixed results and have not always kept pace with scientific advancements.85 Furthermore, if an 
early medical test were developed for Alzheimer’s disease that did not involve genetic information, 
such as blood tests evaluating protein levels, it is unclear to what extent these anti-discrimination 
protections would apply to diagnosed individuals. Before introducing early medical testing for AD 
into clinical practice, government leaders will need to examine whether existing protections are 
sufficient for diagnosed individuals and how these protections affect the viability of voluntary 
private insurance markets. 
Conclusion 
In summary, our survey indicates that across four European countries and the United States, 
interest in early medical testing for Alzheimer’s disease is high. We expect those with high levels of 
perceived risk—those who are worried about getting AD as well as those with more experience with 
the disease, including caregivers and blood relatives of AD patients—will be among those most 
likely to pursue testing once it becomes available. While early detection could hasten the 
development of treatment protocols, high demand for testing and the creation of a large group of 
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asymptomatic adults with an Alzheimer’s diagnosis could have significant political, economic, and 
legal implications, and could transform the way AD is addressed by countries in the future.  
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Paper II: Race, Ethnicity, and Geography Matter: Disparities in Medicaid Enrollment 
Among Low-Income Parents 
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Introduction !
The Supreme Court’s ruling on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act created an 
option for states to forego the law’s intended expansion of Medicaid eligibility to adults under 133% 
of poverty ($30,657 for a family of 4). Prior to this ruling, many experts praised the expansion 
because of its anticipated effects on reducing racial and ethnic disparities in access to health 
insurance coverage.86 To date, more than a dozen states have indicated they might not undertake the 
Medicaid expansion.87,88 Although uneven adoption of the expansion would stymie efforts to reduce 
disparities in coverage, other provisions in the law—including those that standardize Medicaid 
enrollment procedures—could still significantly improve access to care among minority 
populations.89  
Medicaid enrollment, at the national level, varies significantly across different racial and 
ethnic groups.90,91 Prior research also shows that Medicaid enrollment varies across states—take-up 
is highest in liberal states, where Medicaid benefits are most generous, and lowest in conservative 
states, where benefits are less generous.90 What has not previously been studied is whether racial and 
ethnic disparities in Medicaid enrollment vary across states along ideological lines, and how state 
Medicaid policies mediate these enrollment patterns.  
This paper examines the interacting effects of ideology, Medicaid policy, and race/ethnicity 
on take-up rates at the state level. Overall, we find that between 2003 and 2010, minorities in 
conservative states, particularly Hispanics, were significantly less likely than all other groups to enroll 
in Medicaid when eligible. However, adjusting for differences in state Medicaid policies significantly 
reduced these disparities in take-up across states.  
 !37!
Understanding the dynamics of these racial and ethnic disparities and how they vary at the 
state level could inform policymakers—even those in states that oppose the Medicaid expansion—
seeking to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in access to health insurance coverage. 92,93  
Literature Review 
State-level determinants of Medicaid enrollment: the role of state ideology  !
Building on research on individual-level determinants of program take-up, Sommers and 
colleagues found that where someone lived was among the strongest predictors of Medicaid 
participation—second only to category of eligibility.90,94,95 Adjusting for individual demographics, 
take-up rates among all eligible adults ranged from 43% in Arkansas to 82.8 percent in 
Massachusetts. Moreover, these state-level differences correlated strongly with state ideology scores: 
adjusted take-up rates were 69.1% in liberal states, 61.1% in moderate states, and 54.0% in 
conservative states (p<0.001).90 The authors argued that differences in state Medicaid policies 
explain most of this state-level variation. For example, controlling for individual demographics, 
liberal states were more likely than conservative states to have generous Medicaid benefit 
packages—offering more services and requiring lower levels of cost-sharing—which, in turn, were 
associated with higher rates of take-up among eligible adults. 90  
Extensive research has established the correlation between state ideology scores and the left-
right distribution of state policies: Even controlling for state wealth, urbanism, and education, 
ideologically liberal states (as measured by public opinion polls) enacted laws that were, on average, 
far more liberal than policies in conservative states. 96,97 In a separate analysis, we found similar 
results for the Medicaid policies used in this study (see Appendix).  
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Medicaid Enrollment and Race/Ethnicity at the National Level  
 Although overall rates of insurance coverage have been consistently lower for minority 
populations, Medicaid enrollment historically has been high among eligible African Americans, and 
lower among whites, Hispanics, and individuals of other racial and ethnic backgrounds.86,98 Between 
2005 and 2010, among adults, 66.4% of eligible blacks enrolled for Medicaid coverage compared to 
just 60.8% of eligible whites.90 Moreover, a study of Medicaid expansions between the years of 1996 
and 2001 found that eligible black mothers were more likely than whites or Hispanics to gain 
coverage.95 However, no previous studies have examined racial and ethnic inequalities in Medicaid 
take-up at the state level.  
Study Data and Analysis 
Data 
Demographic and health insurance eligibility data for years 2003 to 2010 came from the 
Annual Social and Economic (ASEC) supplement of the Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey (CPS), which was downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-
CPS).99 
We estimated Medicaid eligibility using self-reported family income data from the survey 
matched against income eligibility thresholds published by the Kaiser Family Foundation.100–106 
Eligibility thresholds also varied with state ideology, ranging from 17% of the federal poverty level in 
Arkansas to 207% in the District of Columbia in 2010.  
Our sample of 24,230 adults included U.S. citizens, aged 19-64, who had at least one child 
under age 19 living in their home. We excluded parents who reported having private health 
insurance or Medicare coverage. We focus on parents because they are the largest group of low-
income adults currently eligible for Medicaid coverage.  
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Our models’ primary outcome was take-up: whether a given respondent who was eligible for 
Medicaid in the prior year reported having Medicaid coverage. The key predictor variables were 
race/ethnicity and state ideology. Respondents were divided into four racial/ethnic categories: white 
non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and other racial groups (including Asian and Pacific 
Islanders and other non-Hispanic mixed-race individuals). Drawing on methods introduced by 
Erikson, Wright, and McIver, we generated state ideology scores using public opinion data from the 
Gallup Daily Tracking poll from 2008 through 2010.96 For each year, we subtracted the percent of a 
state’s population that identified as liberal from the percent that identified as conservative.107 We 
then ranked states (50 states plus the District of Columbia), and divided them into three categories 
of equal size—conservative, moderate, and liberal. For a full listing of states in each category, see 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Ideology Scores for US States 
Conservative Moderate Liberal 
Alabama Alaska California 
Arkansas Arizona Colorado 
Georgia Delaware Connecticut 
Idaho Florida D.C. 
Kentucky Indiana Hawaii 
Louisiana Iowa Illinois 
Mississippi Kansas Maine 
Nebraska Michigan Maryland 
North Dakota Missouri Massachusetts 
Oklahoma Montana Minnesota 
South Carolina Nevada New Hampshire 
South Dakota New Mexico New Jersey 
Tennessee North Carolina New York 
Texas Ohio Oregon 
Utah Pennsylvania Rhode Island 
West Virginia Virginia Vermont 
Wyoming Wisconsin Washington 
Note: Ideology scores are based off three-year averages of Gallup polling 
data available from 2008-2010. 
 
We adjusted for additional demographic and state-level variables that may affect Medicaid 
enrollment, including disability status, age, gender, employment status, educational status, family 
income, self-reported health, marital status, metropolitan status, family size, and having a noncitizen 
household member. 90,94,95,108 We also included measures of state economic well being, such as state 
unemployment rates, median household income, and annual Federal Medical Assistance Percentages 
(FMAP), which represent cost of enrolling an additional person in the state Medicaid program and is 
tied to the state poverty rate. To account for other time-varying measures, such as the effects of the 
economic recession beginning in 2008, we included year fixed effects.  
We also included both individual and composite measures of state Medicaid policies that 
have been described elsewhere.90 These policy measures capture both levels of administrative 
hassle—including the availability of combined family applications, face-to-face interview 
requirements, and the length and reading level of applications—and policies related to the generosity 
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of benefit packages—such as cost-sharing requirements, scope of covered services, and provider 
reimbursement rates.  
Analysis !
We first calculated survey-weighted means for rates of take-up at the national level, and then 
ran logistic regression models to evaluate the interaction of race/ethnicity and state ideology in 
predicting disparities in rates of Medicaid take-up. We ran additional analyses to evaluate the amount 
of variation in take-up explained by state Medicaid policies, and tested whether the composition of 
the Hispanic population influenced disparities in take-up. For this analysis, we looked specifically at 
differences between Hispanics of Mexican descent and all other non-Mexican Hispanics. For all of 
our models, we also generated predicted probabilities of take-up across racial/ethnic groups in 
conservative, moderate, and liberal states, holding all other variables in the model at their observed 
values. We clustered the standard errors at the state-level, and include person-level weights. We used 
Stata 11 to account for complex survey design. 
Limitations !
Our study has several limitations. First, our methods of estimating eligibility relied on total 
family income figures provided by the Current Population Survey, but state Medicaid agencies use 
monthly income data to determine eligibility, which may bias our sample. Also, the Kaiser Family 
Foundation data on eligibility thresholds may not include some income disregards implemented by 
particular states. Given that the Census survey does not collect data on assets, we were unable to 
adjust directly for these asset limits. Our analysis also excluded parents enrolled under Section 1115 
waivers that offered fewer benefits than traditional Medicaid. 
Another limitation is that the Current Population Survey does not include information on 
immigration status, meaning that we are unable to identify legal permanent residents who are 
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potentially eligible for coverage; instead, we limited our analysis to U.S. citizens. This is particularly 
relevant for estimates of participation among Hispanics, since this ethnic group is likely to have a 
higher number of legal permanent residents than other racial/ethnic groups. If anything, we suspect 
that excluding these legal residents may cause our study to underestimate disparities in take-up based 
on ethnicity. 
A related concern is that our analysis relies on self-reported citizenship status, raising the 
possibility that some immigrant CPS respondents may misstate their status and thus bias our results. 
However, analyses comparing the CPS and the 2000 Census find no evidence of this type of 
misrepresentation, concluding that the citizenship measure in the CPS is accurate and reliable.109  
Prior research has documented that the CPS underestimates Medicaid enrollment due to 
enrollee confusion about enrollment status and program stigma, although recent studies have 
suggested that the scope of such misreporting is limited.110,111 This underreporting may lead us to 
underestimate overall take-up rates, though to our knowledge, no studies exist exploring whether 
underreporting varies by race/ethnicity.  
 Lastly, we recognize that family incomes among the poor and near-poor tend to fluctuate 
over time, such that families “churn” on and off the Medicaid program, often within a single year.112 
If income volatility varies by race/ethnicity, then the administrative hassle of enrolling and re-
enrolling could lead to higher disparities than documented here since our study examines only year-
by-year enrollment.  
Results !
The unadjusted average Medicaid take-up rate for all eligible parents between the years 2003 
and 2010 was 54%, similar to estimates in previous studies.90 We also found that take-up varied 
dramatically by state and correlated significantly with state ideology, with take-up rates around 20% 
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for eligible parents in conservative states, such as Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, and around 75% 
in liberal states such as Maine and Massachusetts. Nationally, eligible African American respondents 
had the highest levels of take-up of any racial group (57%)(Table 2. 2). Descriptive statistics for the 
entire sample can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Table 2.2. Mean Take-up Rates for Parents Eligible for 
Medicaid Coverage By Race/Ethnic Group, 2003-2010 
 Race/Ethnicity Mean Take-up Rate Standard Error 
    
All groups 0.54 0.02 
Whites 0.54 0.02 
Blacks 0.57 0.03 
Hispanics 0.51 0.05 
Other 0.51 0.03 
Note: Data weighted using person-level weights provided 
by IPUMS CPS. N=24,230 
   
 
However, these racial differences were not consistent across all states. Interacting 
race/ethnicity with state ideology, we found that in conservative and moderate states, Hispanics 
were less likely than whites or blacks to enroll when eligible (Figure 2.1). For example, in 
conservative states, 23% of eligible Hispanics enrolled in Medicaid compared to 38% of both whites 
and blacks, adjusting for individual and state characteristics (p<0.01). In moderate states, we found 
similar differences between whites and blacks versus Hispanics (p<0.05). Parents of other racial 
backgrounds were also significantly less likely than whites or blacks to enroll in Medicaid when 
eligible (p<0.001). However, in liberal states, these trends reverse— eligible whites were less likely 
than blacks and parents of other backgrounds to enroll for coverage (59% versus 64% and 65%, 
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respectively; p<0.01). Differences in take-up between whites and Hispanics in Liberal states were 
not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
Looking across the ideological spectrum, the differences were even more dramatic. 
Hispanics living in liberal states were two and a half times more likely than Hispanics in conservative 
states to enroll in Medicaid when eligible (61% versus 23%, p < 0.001). These racial and ethnic 
differences persisted over the entire study period.  
The Role of State Policies !
The design and implementation of state Medicaid policies affected racial and ethnic 
disparities in enrollment (Table 2.3). Controlling for differences in state Medicaid policies increased 
the predicted probability of take-up by 13 percentage points for blacks and 17 percentage points for 
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Figure 2.1 Interaction of  Medicaid Take-Up and State Ideology by 
Racial Group, Controlling for Individual- and State-Level Factors; 
National Sample of  Parents Eligible for Coverage, 2003-2010,  
n=24,230.  
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Hispanics who lived in conservative states (see graph in the Appendix). In fact, when we evaluated 
the total magnitude of the ideology effect on Hispanics (by comparing Hispanics and whites in 
conservative states), we found that roughly 46% of the disparity in participation can be explained by 
state policies, particularly policies relating to the generosity of Medicaid benefits, while the other 
54% appears to be a ‘direct’ effect of ideology, persisting after adjustment for state policies.  
Yet, even after adjusting for demographic and policy differences, predicted rates of Medicaid 
enrollment for Hispanics in conservative states (40%) remained significantly lower than for whites 
(49%) and blacks (52%) in those same states (p<0.01). 
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Table 2.3 Logistic Regression Models Evaluating Whether the Interaction Between Race and 
State Ideology Affects Medicaid Enrollment 
Variable Interaction Model  Model with 
Interaction and State 
Medicaid Policies 
Race, Ethnicity, Ideology, & Interactions   
 
White -- -- 
 
Black 1.010 (0.145) 1.138 (0.207) 
 
Hispanic 0.464** (0.119) 0.681** (0.088) 
 
Other 0.754 (0.191) 0.816 (0.130) 
 
Conservative 1 (.) 1 (.) 
 
Moderate  1.853* (0.500) 1.532* (0.284) 
 
Liberal 2.492** (0.753) 1.086 (0.292) 
 
Whites in Conservative states -- -- 
 
Whites in Moderate States -- -- 
 
Whites in Liberal States -- -- 
 
Blacks in Conservative States -- -- 
 
Blacks in Moderate States 1.052 (0.167) 1.007 (0.188) 
 
Blacks in Liberal States 1.245 (0.197) 1.097 (0.205) 
 
Hispanics in Conservative States -- -- 
 
Hispanics in Moderate States 1.696+ (0.469) 1.226 (0.206) 
 
Hispanics in Liberal States 2.332** (0.729) 1.494* (0.299) 
 
Other Racial Groups in Conservative States -- -- 
 
Other Racial Groups in Moderate States 0.947 (0.255) 0.794 (0.150) 
 
Other Racial Groups in Liberal States 1.747* (0.484) 1.538* (0.299) 
Factors Related to Benefit of Coverage   
 
Scope of covered Medicaid Services   1.013*** (0.003) 
 
 Dental Coverage   1.431*** (0.154) 
 
Percentage of state enrollees in managed care   1.000 (0.000) 
 
Annual Cost Sharing   1.001 (0.001) 
 
Provider Reimbursement (percent of national 
mean) 
  1.273 (0.349) 
Factors Related to Hassle of Enrollment   
 
Face-to-face interview when applying  0.955 (0.147) 
 
Face-to-face interview when renewing  0.870 (0.122) 
 
Shared application for family members  1.068 (0.101) 
 
Frequency of eligibility renewal (months)  1.019 (0.016) 
 
Self-declaration of residency  0.998 (0.152) 
 
Application length (pages)  1.004 (0.004) 
 
Application literacy level  1.004 (0.054) 
 
Application available in Spanish  0.559** (0.108) 
 
Application available in other languages  0.979 (0.127) 
 
Application can be submitted by telephone  1.094 (0.192) 
 
Application can be submitted online (by 
consumer) 
 0.659** (0.091) 
 
Application can be submitted online (by 
provider) 
 1.058 (0.135) 
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Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 
Separate application for disabled adults  0.935 (0.103) 
 
Application combined with other programs  0.869 (0.107) 
 
Asset test used for eligibility determination  0.741* (0.103) 
Notes: Authors' calculations of Current Population Survey Data from 2003-2010. Sample of 
24,320 United States citizens with no alternative form of coverage. Estimates are odds ratios; 
Standard errors clustered at state level and located in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01,*** p<0.001. All models control for education, employment, family income, health 
status, age, gender, urban status, marital status, family size, noncitizen household member, 
annual state unemployment rates, FMAP rates, median household income, and year. 
 
Compositional Effects !
 Subsequent analyses showed that the composition of Hispanic populations across liberal, 
moderate, and conservative states contributed to disparities in rates of take-up. Previous research 
has found that insurance rates vary across Hispanic subgroups, with adults of Mexican descent 
consistently reporting the lowest rates of insurance coverage of any kind.113 Consistent with this 
research, we found that, on average, Mexican citizens eligible for Medicaid had consistently lower 
take-up rates than non-Mexican Hispanics across conservative, moderate, and liberal states, adjusted 
for demographics and state policies (see graph in the Appendix). The differences were starkest in 
conservative states, where Mexicans made up more than 80% of the eligible Hispanic population. 
Controlling for differences in state policies, take-up among eligible Mexicans was 38% whereas take-
up among non-Mexican Hispanics was 50%, similar to rates for whites and blacks (p<0.001).  
Discussion !
Our results indicate that national analyses of Medicaid enrollment miss important state-level 
variation in rates of take-up across racial and ethnic subgroups. Exploring the interacting effects of 
state ideology and race/ethnicity among U.S. citizens, we found that Medicaid enrollment varied 
across racial and ethnic subgroups in liberal, moderate, and conservative states. These disparities 
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were most dramatic in conservative states: take-up rates for Hispanics were 23%, whereas take-up 
was 38% for both whites and blacks in those same states, controlling for state and individual 
demographics.  
Moreover, within racial/ethnic groups, enrollment varied across liberal, moderate, and 
conservative states. While whites were significantly less likely to enroll in Medicaid in conservative 
states than in liberal states (38% versus 59% take-up), the differences were much larger for blacks 
(38% versus 64%). Enrollment disparities were again starkest among Hispanic populations: a 
Hispanic parent in a liberal state was fully two and a half times as likely to be enrolled in Medicaid 
than a Hispanic in a conservative state, even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic 
variables (23% versus 61%). 
 We estimated that about half of the effect of ideology on racial/ethnic disparities in 
Medicaid enrollment was explained by differences in state Medicaid policies, particularly those 
related to the generosity of Medicaid benefits.  
Among Hispanics, part of the observed disparity appeared to be due to compositional 
effects. Across all states, Mexican Americans were less likely than whites, blacks, and non-Mexican 
Hispanics to enroll for Medicaid when eligible. While Mexicans represented a higher proportion of 
the Hispanic population in conservative states than in other states, this concentration only explained 
a part of the Hispanic under-enrollment in those states. Mexican parents in liberal states enrolled at 
much higher rates than in conservative states, even controlling for policies—in line with other ethnic 
and racial groups. Additional research is needed to better understand why Mexican-Americans who 
are U.S. citizens enroll in Medicaid at lower rates than other racial and ethnic groups. 
After controlling for state policies and compositional effects, state ideology continued to 
exert a significant effect on racial/ethnic disparities in Medicaid enrollment. This could be due to 
any of several hard-to-quantify factors: states’ methods of program outreach, office culture, real or 
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perceived racial/ethnic bias, or dynamics in the broader policy environment. Recent state-level 
analyses demonstrate that these factors can powerfully influence—both positively and negatively—
rates of take-up, especially among minority groups. In California, for example, proximity to bilingual 
application assistance increased monthly Medicaid enrollment by seven to nine percent among 
Hispanics and by about 30% among Asian children, and efforts to revamp eligibility determinations 
in Louisiana and South Carolina using data from other public programs increased rates of 
enrollment and redetermination among eligible children.114–116 Meanwhile, another study found that 
heightened Federal immigration enforcement, measured by the number of deportations between the 
years 1992 and 2003, reduced Medicaid participation among eligible children of non-citizens.  
Further research on the experiences of eligible families who do not enroll in Medicaid may 
be helpful in elucidating the mechanisms for these ongoing disparities. 
 
Policy Implications: Implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
 
 The Affordable Care Act streamlines Medicaid enrollment and moves state Medicaid 
programs towards a more uniform package of benefits, even for states that do not participate in the 
eligibility expansion. This analysis suggests that such changes, by reducing variation in state policies, 
could ameliorate racial/ethnic disparities in Medicaid enrollment.  
 However, our results also suggest that policy changes alone will not eliminate disparities in 
rates of enrollment. Even if states have identical Medicaid policies, our research suggests racial and 
ethnic inequalities may persist in politically conservative states. Some states may implement the new 
laws only to the letter, while others could go beyond pro forma compliance and, as a group of 
Medicaid directors suggested in a recent report about Obamacare implementation, embrace a 
broader culture shift among Medicaid administrators away from welfare-style “gatekeeping” and 
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towards inclusivity.117 Significant federal oversight may be necessary to encourage such a shift in 
states that are ideologically resistant to robust implementation. And even with such oversight, still 
stronger reforms, such as automatic enrollment of eligible adults and aggressive, culturally-specific 
outreach, may be necessary to sharply reduce disparities in Medicaid take-up among racial and ethnic 
minorities.11
!!
 
 
 
 
 
Paper III: Does Market Concentration Affect Administrative Costs? 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the markets for health insurance and hospitals have become 
increasingly consolidated. Empirical research indicates that this consolidation has resulted in higher 
health care costs, particularly higher insurance premiums and hospital prices, and, in some cases, 
lower quality of care.119,120 Less research has been done, however, on whether increased 
consolidation has brought about greater levels of efficiency through improved economies of scale, 
less duplication of services, and increased investment in quality and efficiency.121 If economies of 
scale exist, we would expect to see some reduction in administrative costs across the health care 
system as consolidation rises. In 2009, health administrative expenses were estimated to be about 
$361 billion, or 14 percent of total health care expenditures.122 Recent work suggests that about half 
of these billing and insurance-related expenses are excessive. 
 In this analysis, we evaluate how levels of administrative staff and related labor costs in 
health insurance companies and provider organizations vary across states with different levels of 
insurance market and hospital concentration between the years 2007 and 2010. Understanding the 
role of market consolidation as either a driver of, or a partial solution to, high administrative costs 
could help inform efforts to reduce unnecessary administrative expenses.  
Literature Review 
Insurance Market Competition 
 
Over the past thirty years, there have been hundreds of mergers in the U.S. health insurance 
market, catalyzing research on both the beneficial and detrimental effects of increased health 
insurance consolidation.119,123,124 Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayan showed that health insurance 
market concentration increased in the large-group market between 1998 and 2006.119 The American 
Medical Association, which publishes annual reports on insurance market competition, has found 
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similar levels of concentration across states, although they found a slight decrease in market 
concentration in recent years. 125 
In theory, market consolidation could generate value by reducing management inefficiencies 
and increasing economies of scale. In the health insurance market, these gains could come from 
consolidation of administrative services, firm locations, provider networks, and technological 
processing, and so forth. 126 For example, the National Health Lawyers Association reported that the 
merger between Aetna and U.S. Health Care in 1996 resulted in the closure of half of their claim 
processing centers and a reduction of 4,000 jobs in their health divisions, producing some cost 
savings. 127  
Nevertheless, studies on the aggregate effects of these mergers on efficiency have not shown 
promising findings. Engberg and others evaluated HMO mergers between 1985 and 1997 and found 
no relationship between increased consolidation and gains in production efficiency.126 Similarly, 
Weech-Maldonado assessed the effect of HMO mergers between 1988 and 1994 on both insurance 
companies’ administrative expense ratios and medical loss ratios and found no evidence of improved 
financial performance on either measure.128 While a study on the California HMO market between 
1986 and 1992 did find evidence of increased efficiency, this only applied to mergers between 
HMOs with less than 115,000 enrollees. As with other studies, these returns disappeared for mergers 
among larger firms.129 Another study pegged the enrollee threshold even lower, at 50,000. 130 
At least two mechanisms may be driving the association between insurance market 
competition and administrative costs in the health care system. First, as insurance market 
concentration increases, insurance companies could use their increased market power to impose cost 
reductions on others, by, for example, negotiating lower payments to hospital or provider 
organizations.131,132 This could, in turn, pressure providers to reduce internal costs through increased 
efficiency.131,133 Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayan argue that this has indeed occurred. Their 
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research indicates that the increase in market concentration associated with the Aetna-Prudential 
merger of 1999 resulted in significant declines in health-care-related employment and reductions in 
wage growth. Moreover, nurses, compared to other health professionals such as physicians, 
experienced smaller employment decreases and even slight wage increases after the merger—
suggesting a substitution of nurses for physicians.119 Other work has shown that increases in 
insurance market concentration are also associated with decreases in hospital prices.134 For example, 
a descriptive analysis of U.S. hospital markets found that hospital prices in the most concentrated 
health plan markets were 12 percent lower than at hospitals in more competitive health plan 
markets.135  
 A second possibility is that consolidation reduces the number of insurance companies with 
which providers must interact, thus lowering their costs. Casalino et al. conducted a national survey 
of provider offices in 2006 and found that physicians spent an average of 43 minutes per day 
interacting with health plans, while nurses spent 3.8 hours per day per physician and clerical staff 
spent 7.2 hours per day per physician conducting such administrative transactions. The authors 
estimate that these interactions cost between $23 and $31 billion at the national level.136 Other 
observational studies have yielded similar cost estimates.137 One might expect that administrative 
costs would decrease as the number of insurance companies in a given market decreased—if, in fact, 
the consolidated entities streamlined their internal processes post-merger.  
Hospital Market Consolidation  
 
Hospital consolidation began in the late 1990s, tapered off in the early 2000s, and recently 
picked back up, in part due to policies passed under the Affordable Care Act.138 The number of 
hospitals that are part of a health care system increased from 2,542 in 2000 to 3,007 in 2011, an 18 
percent increase.139 Moreover, the percent of primary care and specialist physicians employed by 
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hospitals rose from about 18 percent and 6 percent, respectively, to over 30 percent and 15 percent 
in 2008.140  
As in the case of insurance market consolidation, hospital consolidation could have positive 
effects for consumers: it could reduce costs by enhancing economies of scale, boosting purchasing 
power, consolidating services, and transferring managerial techniques and skills across 
organizations.121 Evidence, however, shows mixed results. Dranove and Lindrooth examine hospital 
mergers between previously independent entities and found cost savings only in those hospitals that 
achieved meaningful integration through combined clinical and economic operations.138,141,142 In 
other hospitals, however, such integration did not occur, and consolidation just created bigger and 
less efficient bureaucracies.121 Thus, hospital market consolidation could result in increased 
administrative efficiency if it precipitated financial and clinical integration across hospital 
departments. 
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Study Data and Analysis 
 
 Table 3.1 summarizes our data sources and variables. 
 
 
Table 3.1. Data Sources and Variables 
Data Source and Type Variables  
Clerical Data and Demographic Data 
 IPUMS-CPS Number of clerical workers by Industry 
and Occupation (only health care 
providers), wages 
 Statistics of U.S. Businesses Number of health insurance firms, 
employees, and payroll at state and 
metro area 
Market Concentration Data 
 American Medical Association 
Competition in Healthcare 
Reports, Interstudy 
HMO/PPO market share, top two 
insurance carriers, HHI by state  
 American Hospital Association 
Annual Statistics 
Hospital admissions, location, beds 
Physician Distribution and Location Data 
 American Medical Association 
Physician Characteristics Reports 
Distribution and location of Physicians 
Across States 
Demographic Data 
 U.S. Census Bureau Population, Percent Urban 
 Bureau of Labor Statistics Median Household Income, 
Unemployment Rate 
 Centers for Disease Control Death Rate (per 100,000) 
Market Characteristics 
  Kaiser Family Foundation, 
Interstudy 
HMO Penetration Rates 
 
 
Administrative Staffing Levels and Cost Data 
 
To analyze changes in administrative staff between 2007 and 2010, we drew data from two 
sources. For insurance companies, we used the US Census Bureau’s “Statistics of U.S. Businesses” 
to look at the number of firms, employees, and payroll for health and medical insurance carriers, 
coded under the 2007 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) as 524114. These 
data were not broken down by occupation groups within firms, but did provide overall staffing 
levels for health insurers by state. We include the total number of employees within health insurance 
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carriers in our administrative staffing calculations since none of these staff serve in a clinical 
capacity.2  
Information on clerical staff for provider organizations came from the Integrated Public-Use 
Microdata Series-Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS) database.99 We focused our analysis on 
respondents who worked in office and administrative support occupations (Standard Occupational 
Classification codes 5000 through 5930) within the in “Health Care and Social Assistance” industries 
(NAICS Sector 62). The survey also includes pre-tax wage and salary income data, which we used to 
generate administrative cost data. We weighted this data using person-level weights supplied by the 
Census Bureau, and then summed these totals at the state level to create a state-year panel dataset.3 
We adjusted income data to 2010 dollars, and we increased it to include the value of employee 
benefits, which accounted for 30 percent of total compensation packages in 2010.143  
We analyzed the number of administrative staff across different health care industries, 
benchmarking these estimates by numbers of physicians to ease interpretation. We scaled the 
number of administrative staff in health insurance companies and hospitals by the total number of 
physicians involved in patient care in the state for each year, as reported by the American Medical 
Association, and similarly, scaled administrative staff in providers’ offices by the number of office-
based physicians in each state and year.144–147  
Health Plan and Hospital Concentration Data 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 For states where employment numbers were suppressed for confidentiality or quality reasons, we 
relied on employment ranges provided by the Census bureau, using the lower of the two estimates. 
A significant number of states do not report payroll data for health insurers for confidentiality 
reasons, so we do not conduct cost estimates for health insurance companies. 
 
3 For the purposes of this analysis, we include Washington, D.C. as a state. 
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Our insurance market concentration data came from the American Medical Association’s 
annual “Competition in health insurance” reports, which were generated by Interstudy, a health care 
data company.125,148–1504 Hospital data came from American Hospital Association Annual Surveys. 
To measure concentration across health plans and hospitals, we employ a standard 
concentration index variable—the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is the sum of squared 
market shares for all firms in a given market. Scores range from zero (many competitors) to 10,000 
(one facility with 100% market share). The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice use this index as a diagnostic tool to assess how proposed mergers and acquisitions will affect 
market competition. In 2010, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission revised 
its horizontal merger guidelines, increasing the threshold for highly concentrated markets from 1,800 
to 2,500.151 
In calculating our insurance market concentration scores, we used state-level concentration 
scores for the combined health maintenance organization and preferred provider organization 
market. Although some argue that these products should be considered separately because of 
differences in costs and benefit design, lines between these products are becoming more blurred for 
consumers, and empirical work suggests that the correlations between measures of concentration 
that consider these products separately and combined are very high.132,135,152 We analyze insurance 
market concentration as both a continuous variable and as a categorical variable, with thresholds 
based on previous research and the recently revised Department of Justice Guidelines: less than 
1500, 1500-2500, 2500-3200, 3200 and above.135  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The reports included data on the market share of health insurers by enrollment as well as state-level 
scores of market concentration for the combined HMO/PPO market. Interstudy did not report 
results for some states each year, largely because some states did not meet their 30 percent threshold 
for the ratio of total enrollments reported by all health insurance plans to the population eligible to 
be covered in that area. In 2010, reported state-level data captured about 70 percent of the eligible 
insured population. 
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We used hospital admission data in the metropolitan statistical areas to calculate hospital 
concentration scores. We then used metropolitan statistical area population data to weight these 
scores and aggregate them at the state level. We measure hospital concentration as both a 
continuous measure and as a categorical variable: less than 1500, 1500-2500, 2500-3200, 3200 and 
above.  
In recent years, hospitals have also increased their market power by employing larger 
numbers of physicians.153 To account for changing these changing physician arrangements, we 
include a ratio of the number of hospital-based physicians (including residents, fellows, and hospital 
staff) to the number of physicians who are office-based in each state and year, using American 
Medical Association data.144–147 These data are self-reported, so although hospital-based generally 
refers to physicians who work in hospitals, the term may also include some physicians who work in 
practices owned by hospitals.  
Data on Control Variables 
 
We include controls for other aspects of health insurance markets that might influence 
administrative staffing levels or demand for health care services, which drives up the number of 
administrative transactions conducted. Using Census data, we include demographic factors such as 
the percent of people living in urban areas as reported in 2000, the percent of the population over 
65, and median household income. We also control for health care quality, incorporating crude 
mortality rates (e.g. the number of deaths per 10,000 people in state).154 Studies of managed care in 
the late 1990s showed that the rise of HMOs was largely responsible for reducing health care cost 
growth mainly by negotiating better rates with provider organizations.155 Although the effect of 
HMO penetration has waned since 2000, Shen et al. show that it remains an important driver of 
hospital operating costs.156 To account for the impact that managed care could have on 
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administrative costs, particularly for providers, we include a state-level measure of HMO penetration 
from 2010.157 During this time period, some states either enacted or continued implementing state-
level reforms to simplify administrative costs, most notably Minnesota, Washington, Colorado, and 
Utah; we include a dichotomous variable to account for states with such reforms and the years they 
were enacted.158 Finally, we include year fixed effects measures to account for changes in 
administrative staff over time. The final sample included 175 state-year observations. 
Analysis Plan 
 
We ran descriptive statistics on administrative staffing levels and costs across states with 
different levels of market concentration in both health plans and hospitals. We then used regression 
analysis to explore the association between administrative staffing levels and insurance market and 
hospital concentration scores, adjusting for related factors. We tested for potential interactions 
between provider market and insurance market concentration scores. For each outcome predictor, 
we include only those control variables that are significantly correlated with our outcome variables 
and improve the performance of the overall model. Standard errors were robust and clustered at the 
state-level.  
Using results from our pooled regression model, we also ran a series of simulations to test 
how changes in market concentration would affect administrative staffing levels across payers and 
providers. We consider the effects of an increase in 1000 points in market concentration; the effects 
of all states becoming as concentrated as the most concentrated state in our sample; and the effects 
of all states becoming as concentrated as the least concentrated state in our sample. We estimate 
similar changes in the ratio of hospital-based to office-based providers: the effects of changing the 
ratio in all states to mirror the state with the highest hospital-based office-based physician ratio, and 
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the effects of changing all states to mirror the state with the lowest ratio. We conducted our analysis 
using Stata MP software.  
Limitations  
 
Recent work has argued that the year-to-year volatility observed in the insurance market 
concentration data released by the American Medical Association is more likely due to measurement 
error than a true changes in market conditions.159 To account for this volatility, we use pooled 
regression models that control for year fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the state level 
rather than using random-effects models (see table in the Appendix).  
We also focus on state-level measures of market concentration and administrative costs, 
which may mask important variation across geographic markets within states. Prior work on the 
effects of market concentration has defined geographic markets in numerous ways, using state 
boundaries, metropolitan statistical areas, and zip codes.151,152,160,161 Although more local data is ideal, 
both the volatility in our insurance market concentration data and small sample sizes for 
administrative staff limit our ability to analyze trends within states. Nevertheless, we believe that this 
analysis provides an important first look at the relationship between market concentration and 
administrative expenses.  
Because our measure of administrative costs does not capture all the expenses that have 
traditionally been attributed to administrative spending, such as clinician time spent negotiating with 
insurance companies or capital expenditures, our results may underestimate the impact of market 
concentration on absolute levels of administrative burden.136,137,162–164 Nevertheless, given that 
administrative jobs and office functions are the ones most likely to be consolidated after a merger, 
we believe that this measure, as opposed to medical loss ratios used in earlier studies, may be a more 
sensitive measure and thus more informative on the effects of consolidation.128,165  
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Lastly, the nature of our data and analysis constrains our ability to make causal claims about 
levels of market concentration and administrative staffing and costs.  
Results 
 
 Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics for our sample broken down by levels of insurance 
market and hospital concentration. For every physician providing patient care in a state, 1.27 
administrators are employed by hospitals and 0.56 are employed by health insurance companies. For 
each office-based (as opposed to hospital-based) physician, provider offices employ an average of 
0.89 administrators. Our administrative staff ratio in provider offices is similar to estimates 
published by Casalino et al. who found that clerical staff spent an estimated 35.9 hours per physician 
per week interacting with health plans, which is equivalent to 0.89 staff per physician assuming a 40-
hour work week.136 The costs associated with these administrative staff are roughly equal to average 
annual incomes for these positions, suggesting that changes in staffing coincide with similar changes 
in cost levels (see Appendix for regression results). The mean ratio of hospital-based to office-based 
physicians is about 0.32.  
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Overall, levels of administrative staff per physician vary little across categories of insurance 
market and hospital concentration. Yet, there is a slight decrease in administrative staff at provider 
offices in states with higher levels of insurance market concentration, but a slight increase in 
administrative staff at hospitals in states with higher levels of hospital concentration. These 
differences are not statistically significant. Hospital concentration is significantly, inversely correlated 
with insurance market concentration.  
Table 3.3 displays our data broken down by year. Because shifts over time are more likely 
due to statistical noise than to any underlying shift, these figures should not be interpreted as 
reflecting temporal trends.121,159  
 
Table 3.3. Mean Values of Key Predictor Variables Over 
Time 
  Health Plan 
Concentration 
Hospital 
Concentration 
Hospital/Office-
based Physicians 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
2007 3622 225 2594 233 0.28 0.01 
2008 3192 220 2531 229 0.31 0.01 
2009 3538 207 2416 185 0.33 0.02 
2010 3542 214 2467 186 0.34 0.02 
 
 Table 3.4 displays results from pooled linear regression models estimating the relationship 
between administrative staffing levels per physician and market concentration scores. Most notably, 
we find that, on average, levels of insurance market and hospital concentration appear to have little 
to no relationship with administrative staffing levels across payer and provider settings, with 
provider offices being the one exception. For every thousand-point increase in insurance market 
concentration, the number of administrative staff per physician in provider offices goes down by 
0.04, a small but significant change (p<0.05) (Tables 3.4). Potential interactions between insurer and 
provider concentration are not statistically significant.   
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Table 3.4. Results from Linear Regression Models Predicting Relationship Between Administrative 
Staffing Levels and Market Concentration 
 Health Insurers Provider Offices Hospitals 
Variable Coefficient P-
Value 
Coefficient P-
Value 
Coefficient P-Value 
Health Insurance 
Concentration (HHI) 
-0.000019 0.199 -0.000035* 0.047 0.000040 0.13 
Hospital Concentration 
(HHI) 
-0.000014 0.634 0.000001 0.975 -0.000021 0.531 
Ratio of Hospital-based 
Physicians to Office-Based 
Physicians 
-0.501664+ 0.056 -
0.886270*
* 
0.008 -0.567442 0.155 
Percent of Population in 
Urban Areas 
  0.010513* 0.021   
Death Rate (per 100,000)   0.001049* 0.011   
HMO Penetration 0.099983 0.736 -0.793911* 0.013 -1.41662*** 0 
Median Household Income     -0.000013* 0.013 
Percent of Population Over 
65 
0.040899+ 0.065   0.08468*** 0 
Unemployment Rate   0.036971 0.121   
2007 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
2008 0.049554 0.121 -0.116227 0.27 0.140562 0.155 
2009 0.077219* 0.013 -0.25878+ 0.097 0.004422 0.968 
2010 0.068085+ 0.063 -0.323972* 0.028 -0.055920 0.61 
Constant 0.222709 0.346 -0.277635 0.633 1.129171** 0.009 
Observations 175  175  175  
R-squared 0.126  0.185  0.289  
F 1.981670  6.168729  8.799905  
Note: Standard errors were clustered at the state level.  + p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  
*** p<0.001 
 
 
Using results from these pooled regression models, we simulate the effects of changes in 
insurance market competition and in the ratio of hospital-based to office-based physicians (Table 
3.5). We estimate that if all health insurance markets became as concentrated as the most 
concentrated state, Alabama, the number of administrative staff per physician in provider offices 
would decrease by 0.15 each year, or about 17 percent. (In 2010, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama 
held 93 percent of the market, and the overall concentration index for the state was 8,627, out of a 
maximum score of 10,000. The state very nearly had a single-payer system, albeit a private one.) If 
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we multiply this change by average salary levels for administrative staff in provider offices 
($40,833.90), then this increase in market concentration would be associated with a decrease in 
administrative staffing costs of about $6,315.86 per physician. Multiplying these savings by the total 
number of office-based physicians in 2010 (565,024 physicians), we estimate national level savings to 
be about $3.6 billion for provider offices alone if all states had high rates of insurance market 
concentration.  
 
Table 3.5. Simulated Changes in Administrative Staff Per Physician in Provider Offices 
Variable Change in 
Admin 
Staff/MD 
Percent 
change 
Dollar 
Change 
Health Insurance Market Concentration (1000 
point increase) 
-0.04 -4% -$1,429.16 
Health Insurance Market Concentration (all 
states become as concentrated as MOST 
concentrated health insurance market: Alabama) 
-0.15 -17% -$6,315.89 
Health Insurance Market Concentration (all 
states become as concentrated as LEAST 
concentrated health insurance market: Florida). 
0.05 6% $2,156.88 
    
Ratio of Hospital-Based Physicians to Office-
Based Physicians (All states have same ratio as 
state with highest ratio of hospital-based to 
office-based physicians: District of Columbia)  
-0.45 -50% -$18,175.01 
Ratio of Hospital-Based Physicians to Office-
Based Physicians (All states have same ratio as 
state with lowest ratio of hospital-based to office-
based physicians: Nevada).  
0.14 16% $5,872.49 
Note: Author's calculations based on pooled regression model results presented in 
Table 3.4. Simulations of high and low market concentration values report average 
decreases or increases in administrative staff in provider offices across all states and 
years. 
 
We also find that increasing the ratio of hospital-based to office-based physicians is 
associated with decreases in administrative staffing levels across payers and providers, controlling for 
insurance market and hospital concentration. For example, when we increase the ratio of hospital-to 
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office-based physicians in all states to match the state with the highest ratio, the District of 
Columbia, this change is associated with an average decrease in administrative staff provider offices 
of -0.45, a decrease of 50 percent, equal to $18,175 per physician or $10.3 billion nationally. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Overall, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between insurance market or 
hospital market concentration scores and administrative staffing levels across payers or hospitals. 
Health insurers and hospitals in more consolidated markets do not enjoy lower administrative costs 
themselves, and neither do the payers and providers that have to interact with them.  
Provider offices are an exception to this. We find a small but statistically significant 
relationship between insurance market consolidation and reduced administrative staffing levels per 
physician in provider offices. Physicians and other provider organizations currently pay more than 
$214 billion each year on administrative expenses, more than 60 percent of total administrative costs 
and double the amount borne by health insurance companies.122 According to our results, 
nationwide Alabama-level health insurance concentration would be associated with provider-office 
administrative savings of $3.6 billion, or 1.7 percent of provider administrative costs.  
We also found large reductions in provider office administrative expenses associated with an 
increase in the ratio of hospital-based to office-based physicians. This suggests that, as physicians 
move into hospital settings—or hospitals buy physicians’ practices and consolidate financial 
administration—the administrative costs per physician go down.  
Although our results cannot provide conclusive answers on the mechanisms underlying our 
association between insurance market concentration and administrative staff in provider offices, they 
do provide some useful insight on why administrative costs might be lower in concentrated 
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insurance markets. As mentioned, consolidation may lower the cost to providers of dealing with 
multiple health plans. However, for this to be true, it would require that consolidated health 
insurance companies invest in revamping the processes that drive up provider administrative 
costs.122 We found no significant relationship between employment levels of administrative staff in 
health insurance companies and levels of insurance market concentration, which we would have 
expected if these companies were in fact making their internal administrative systems more efficient. 
The other possible explanation is that, in highly concentrated insurance markets, health 
insurers simply offer lower payments to physician organizations, spurring providers to reduce 
spending on administration.119 Assuming that both provider offices and hospitals will spend 
resources to process claims as long as the financial return on these claims exceeds the staffing costs 
required to process them, reduced payments per claim from insurers could push more claims below 
the threshold at which they are worth processing. If, due to volume, the marginal cost of submitting 
a claim is higher for provider offices than for hospitals, then lower payments will trigger reductions 
in administrative spending by provider offices before they would do so in hospitals. This description 
matches our findings: greater insurance industry concentration is significantly associated with lower 
administrative staff among provider offices but not among hospitals. Future research is needed to 
clarify whether these or other mechanisms are responsible.  
The Impact of Health Reform 
  
 Looking ahead, a suite of policy changes associated with the Affordable Care Act could 
affect levels of insurance market concentration, provider market concentration, and administrative 
costs.  
The introduction of the individual mandate, state-based health insurance exchanges, and 
state Medicaid expansions will substantially increase the number of people purchasing private health 
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insurance coverage. This could lead to a rise in insurance market competition as more plans compete 
for shares of expanded state markets. Our results suggest that this could be associated with a 
reduction in provider office efficiency as the market power of insurers falls. 
 Payment reforms introduced under the Affordable Care Act have already spurred increased 
consolidation across providers.166 Our results find no relationship between administrative staffing 
levels and provider market concentration, suggesting that prior to 2010, hospital mergers and 
acquisitions were most likely focused on increases in market power rather than on producing 
integrated, streamlined care systems. It is possible that health reforms could succeed in encouraging 
providers to integrate clinical and financial systems more comprehensively, which could bring down 
administrative complexity and costs. Future research is needed to test this hypothesis. 
 Lastly, the administrative simplification reforms included in the Affordable Care Act are 
designed to increase electronic transmission of administrative data. If the new rules reduce 
unnecessary variation in data requirements across health plans and reduce staff time spent on 
administrative transactions via automation, we could see reductions in administrative staffing levels 
across all insurance markets, regardless of concentration levels. However, given that the law stopped 
short of requiring all stakeholders to adopt electronic transactions and failed to make all transactions 
uniform, there will still be some variation across health plans in how they conduct administrative 
transactions. Therefore, in markets with fewer health plans (e.g. more concentrated markets), we 
expect to see these costs go down more rapidly—particularly, given our results, for provider offices
!!
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Appendix 1A. Item wording and coding for Independent Variables 
Variable Survey Question Coding 
Measures of Perceived Threat  
 Have or had an 
Immediate blood relative 
with AD  
"Do you believe that any of your grandparents, 
parents, or siblings has or had Alzheimer's 
disease?" 
Yes, No 
 Respondent is or was 
decision-maker or 
caretaker for AD patient 
Combination of two 
questions  
"Are you or were you one of the people most 
involved in decision-making about or financial 
support of the care for any of the people you 
have known with Alzheimer’s disease?" and 
"Are you or were you one of the people most 
involved in the day-to-day care for any of the 
people you have known with Alzheimer’s 
disease?" 
Yes, No 
 Worried will get 
Alzheimer's Disease 
"How worried are you that you will get 
Alzheimer’s disease? Are you very worried, 
somewhat worried, not too worried, or not 
worried at all?" 
Yes, No 
 "Excellent/Good/Very 
Good" Health Status 
"In general, would you say your health is 
excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor 
Excellent, very 
good, good=1; 
fair, poor=0 
 Think AD is fatal  "Do you think that Alzheimer’s disease is a 
fatal disease or not?" 
Yes, No 
Measures of Perceived Costs and Benefits  
 Marital status of 
respondent 
"Which of the following best describes you? 
Are you: Married, Living with partner but not 
married, Separated, Divorced, Widowed, Have 
never been married?" 
Married=1, Not 
Married=0 
 Expect paid caregiver to 
be primary caretaker if 
develop AD 
"If you had Alzheimer’s disease and required 
significant day-to-day care, who would you 
expect to be the primary person to provide it – 
your spouse, your child, another relative, a 
friend, a caregiver you hire, or a caregiver 
provided by a government agency or charitable 
organization? (Allow only one answer)" 
"Caregiver you 
hire" or 
"caregiver 
provided by a 
government or 
charitable 
organization"=1, 
Else=0 
 Believe an effective AD 
treatment is available 
now or will be in 5 years. 
Combination of two 
questions. 
"To the best of your knowledge, is there an 
effective medical or pharmaceutical treatment 
to slow the progression of Alzheimer’s" 
disease and make the symptoms less severe, or 
not?" Of those who responded no, 
respondents then asked "Do you think there 
will be an effective medical or pharmaceutical 
treatment for Alzheimer’s disease in the next 
five years, or not?" 
Yes, No 
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Appendix 1A (Continued) 
Demographic Controls  
 Age of Respondent "Can you please tell me your age?" 18-29, 30-49, 50-
64, 65-74, 75-85+ 
 
 Gender Coded from Sample Female=1, 
Male=0 
 Educational Attainment "Which is the highest level of school 
completed?" 
Low, Middle, 
High 
 Country of Residence Coded from Sample France, Germany, 
Poland, Spain, 
United States 
 Race "Which of the following best describes your 
race: White or Caucasian, Black or African 
American, Asian or Pacific Islander, Native 
American or American Indian, or Other?" and 
"Are you, yourself of Hispanic or Latino origin 
or descent such as Mexican?" 
White, Black, 
Hispanic, Other 
Measures of Psychological Status  
  Would see doctor if 
showing symptoms of 
AD 
"If you were exhibiting confusion and memory 
loss, would you go to a doctor to determine if 
the cause of the symptoms was Alzheimer’s 
disease or not?"  
Yes, No 
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Appendix 2A. Linear Regression Models Testing the Relationship Between State Ideology and State 
Medicaid Policies 
 Admin Hassle with 
SES 
Admin Hassle with 
SES & Ideology 
Benefit Generosity 
with SES 
Benefit Generosity 
with SES & 
Ideology 
  Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Median 
Household 
Income 
-0.00342* (0.001) -0.0169*** (0.002) 0.0207*** (0.001) 0.0154*** (0.001) 
Percent of 
High School 
Graduates 
-0.00429* (0.002) 0.0270*** (0.002) 0.0246*** (0.002) 0.0193*** (0.002) 
Percent 
Living in 
Urban Areas 
-
0.00485*** 
(0.001) 0.00365**
* 
(0.001) 0.0256*** (0.001) 0.0229*** (0.001) 
Percent 
Non-white  
0.0171*** (0.001) 0.0134*** (0.001) -0.0201*** (0.001) -0.0187*** (0.001) 
Conservative   0 (.)   0 (.) 
Moderate   -0.830*** (0.021)   0.315*** (0.020) 
Liberal   -0.380*** (0.021)   0.369*** (0.020) 
Constant 0.589*** (0.164) -1.529*** (0.167) -4.701*** (0.153) -4.112*** (0.158) 
Observations 24230   24230   23718   23718   
R-squared 0.040  0.104  0.204  0.216  
F 254.1  469.4  1523.5  1091.5  
Note: Data Primarily from Census Bureau and from Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 
Census Bureau Current Population Survey. Number of observations drops in models predicting benefit 
generosity due to missing physician reimbursement data, which is a component of the benefit generosity 
index, for Tennessee. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,*** p<0.001 ! !
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Appendix 2B. Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Parents and Eligible for Medicaid Coverage, 2003-
2010 
Variable Mean Standard Error   
Variable Mean Standard Error 
Medicaid 
Take-up 0.54 0.02 
 
Metropolitan Status 
  Race    
Urban 0.79 0.03 
White 0.48 0.04 
 
Noncitizen Family Member 0.07 0.02 
Black 0.25 0.03 
 
Family Size 4.1 0.07 
Hispanic 0.20 0.04 
 
Annual Unemployment Rate 0.06 0.19 
Other 0.07 0.01 
 
Federal Matching Rate 0.57 0.02 
Gender   
 
State Median Household 
Income $48,682.00 $1,063.00 
Female 0.75 0.01 
 
Factors Related to Benefit of 
Coverage 
  Male 0.25 0.01 
 
Scope of covered Medicaid 
Services (z-score) 0.08 0.24 
Marital 
Status   
 
 Dental Coverage 0.66 0.09 
Married 0.35 0.02 
 
Percentage of state enrollees in 
managed care 65.65 4.44 
Age     
Annual Cost Sharing 25.87 5.46 
19-24 0.20 0.01 
 
Provider Reimbursement 
(percent of national mean) 0.99 0.06 
25-30 0.24 0.01 
 
Factors Related to Hassle of 
Enrollment 
  31-40 0.32 0.01 
 
Face-to-face interview when 
applying 0.22 0.10 
41-50 0.18 0.01 
 
Face-to-face interview when 
renewing 0.12 0.05 
51-64 0.06 0.01 
 
Shared application for family 
members 0.63 0.11 
Working 
Parent 0.45 0.01 
 
Frequency of eligibility 
renewal (months) 10.28 0.57 
Education    
Self-declaration of residency 0.24 0.04 
Did not 
complete 
high 
school 0.28 0.01 
 
Application length (pages) 13.33 1.45 
High 
School 
Graduate 0.67 0.01 
 
Application literacy level 9.37 0.44 
College 
Graduate 0.05 0.00 
 
Application available in 
Spanish 0.95 0.02 
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Appendix 2B (Continued) 
Disability 
Status   
 
Application can be submitted 
in other languages 0.26 0.12 
Disabled 0.14 0.01 
 
Application can be submitted 
by telephone 0.23 0.11 
Health 
Status 
 
 
 
Application can be submitted 
online (by consumer) 0.42 0.11 
Excellent 0.21 0.01 
 
Application can be submitted 
online (by provider) 0.27 0.08 
Very 
Good 0.29 0.01 
 
Separate application for 
disabled adults 0.38 0.11 
Good 0.31 0.01 
 
Application combined with 
other programs 0.49 0.12 
Fair 0.14 0.00 
 
State Ideology 
  Poor 0.06 0.00 
 
Conservative 0.18 0.07 
Family 
Income $10,362.00 $1,036 
 
Moderate 0.30 0.10 
  
   
Liberal 0.52 0.12 
Note: Sample limited to adult U.S. citizens, aged 19-64, eligible for Medicaid coverage and 
having no alternative form of health insurance. n=24,230 ! !
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Appendix 2C. Interaction of  Medicaid Take-Up and State Ideology by 
Racial Group, Controlling State Policies; National Sample of  Parents 
Eligible for Coverage, 2003-2010, n=23,718 
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Appendix 2D. Interaction of  Medicaid Take-Up and State Ideology by 
Racial Group, Controlling for Demographics and State Policies; National 
Sample of  Parents Eligible for Coverage, 2003-2010,  n=23,718 
 
Whites 
Blacks 
Hispanics of  
Mexican 
Descent 
Non-Mexican 
Hispanics 
Other 
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Appendix 3A. Results from Linear Regression Models with State Fixed Effects 
Predicting Relationship Administrative Staffing Levels and Market Concentration 
  Health Insurers Provider Offices Hospitals 
  Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Health Insurance 
Concentration (HHI) 
0.000022+ 0.081 0.000013 0.81 -0.000085 0.179 
Hospital Concentration 
(HHI) 
0.000021 0.707 0.000362 0.146 0.000473+ 0.095 
Ratio of Hospital-based 
Physicians to Office-Based 
Physicians 
-1.192575+ 0.075 -1.833419 0.528 2.41456 0.465 
Constant 0.408059 0.15 0.212611 0.863 0.830068 0.554 
R-squared 0.910  0.481  0.575  
F 21.872295  2.001632  2.930946  
Note: Models included year and state fixed effects; n=175; + p<0.10,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    ! !
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Appendix 3B. Results from Linear Regression Models Predicting Relationship 
Between Aggregate Administrative Staffing Costs and Market Concentration 
  Provider Offices Hospitals 
  Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
Health Insurance Concentration 
(HHI) 
-1.507033 0.163 1.446172 0.151 
Hospital Concentration (HHI) -1.985203 0.396 -0.546790 0.659 
Ratio of Hospital-based Physicians 
to Office-Based Physicians 
-39258.23* 0.033 -22113.67 0.135 
Percent of Population in Urban 
Areas 
468.41* 0.012   
Death Rate (per 100,000) 56.55* 0.027   
HMO Penetration -49159.99* 0.024 -21076.15 0.127 
Median Household Income   -0.175716 0.381 
Unemployment Rate -457.89 0.829   
Percent of Population Over 65   1756.35* 0.033 
Constant -7099.95 0.741 30205.90* 0.042 
R-squared 0.114   0.113   
F 4.733495  3.620839  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  
Note: Standard error were clustered at the state level; n=175; + p<0.10,* p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001    
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